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ABSTRACT

State economic developmen t planning involves a
complex series of interrelationships among many different
areas .
While land uses, transportation networks and
economic conditions receive the majority of attention
in most economic development planning, human resources
are an important and often underestinated resource.
In 1978, the Age Discrimination in Employment
ct
of 1967 was amend i d to allow workers to retire at age
70.
Since worker retirements have historically created
many job opportunities for younger workers, including
both internal promotions and employment opportunities
for workers ente r ing the lab or fo r ce f o r th e first time,
serious q uestions have been raised as to the impact of
this legislation on the job mobility opportunities
f o~ younger workers, women and ninorities .
It has been
speculated that a decrease in the job mobility opportunities
for these groups will accel e rate out-migration from Rhode
Island, a development that will negatively affect the
economic health and vitality of the state.
This research project will examine the impact of
raising the age of mandatory retirement on the above
mentioned groups of workers within the Rhode Island
manufacturing con~unity.
In order to accurately assess
the impacts, a mail survey of 107 manufacturing firns
located in Rhode Island was conducted, which provided a
79 percent return of all questionnaires .
The results of this survey indicate that job mobility
for younger workers will be impaired by allowing older
workers to work for longer periods of time .
In addit i on,
employers predict that under continuing high rates of
inflation, the t rend toward early retirement before age
65 will be completely reversed .
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Historically, work in America has been characterized by
competition among the various groups comprising the labor
force.

The nature and extent of this competition has

characterized the context of many public policy decisions.
For example, legislation by the Federal government to restrict imports or the implementation of immi g ration laws
that limit the number of foreign born allowed to emi g rate to
this country are instances of overt uses of public policy to
mollify external forces affecting the degree of competition
for work within the economy .
In addition to the use of public policy as an instrument to exert direct control over external forces that
affect the nature and degree of competition in the workplace public policy has also been used as a vehicle to influence indirectly the forces that affect those currently
competing for work. Thus , policies designed to increase employment for the handicapped, women, minorities or the
unemployed as well as policies designed to regulate the
minimum wages, maximum hours and other standards of work
can be viewed as public policy attempts to mediate between
the competing interests within the workforce.
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It is within this framework of competition for work
that the issues of job opportunity and occupational
mobility can be viewed. Numerous examples exist of public
policies designed to increase the opportunity of workers
to compete in the labor force.

Perhaps the best example

of a comprehensive public policy designed to assure all
Americans the right to equal opportunity in the workforce
has been the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which under Title VII
outlawed discrimination in employment based on sex, race,
color, religion and national origin.
While the question of increasing the opportunity to
compete for work in the labor market has been addressed
through legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
occupational mobility has never been the subject of any
comprehensive legislation. Although occupational or job
mobility has a variety of facets,

it is most commonly

associated with the ability of workers to advance along the
occupational ladder through increases in skill, responsibility,

independence and income. Attempts to address the

issue of occupational or job mobility through public
policy would be particularly problematic, as internal
mobility tends to be a function of worker skill and employer demand.
However,

recent federal legislation has taken a

dramatic step toward increasing the right of older workers
to postpone retirement until age 70. This policy raises
serious questions as to the impacts of this legislation on
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the job mobility for younger workers, women,
ties. In 1978,

and minori-

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA) of 1967 was amended to allow workers to remain in
the labor force until age 70, an action the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac regarded as "probably the most far reaching social measure enacted by the 95th Congress.

11

1

The implications of this public policy change for the
state of Rhode Island, where labor force participation is
approximately 2 percent higher than the rest of the country
and increasing, and where we have an agin g labor force,
suggest that job mobility for younger workers, women and
minorities may be impaired, driving many of these workers
from the state. Such a development would be contrary to
state economic development goals, which seek a population
distribution that will contain fewer proportional members
of the dependent population groups, namely young children
and retired adu l ts, who must be supported by those in the
labor force. Thus, societal trends, like those foreshadowed
by increasing the age of mandatory retirement, have serious
implications for the economic health and vitality of the
state.
This research project will examine the impact of the
1978 amendment to the ADEA of 1967, focusing specifically
on the question of the potential impact on job mobility for
younger workers, women and minorities. This project will
concentrate on these impacts for manufacturing firms located in Rhode Island and will use the employer as the
unit of analysis. The principal research objectives are:
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1.

To determine the short-term impact of the
legislation for younger workers, women and
minorities.

2.

To determine the probable impact on worker
retirement decisions under continued rates
of high inflation.

To achieve these objectives,
duct extensive original research,

it was necessary to conincluding a survey of 107

manufacturing firms currently located in Rhode Island.
The second chapter traces the relevant legislation
concerning the increase in the age of mandatory retirement.
The third chapter examines the historical trends toward
early retirement and the fourth chapter discusses the research findings of other authors.
the

res~1ts

The fifth chapter examines

of the survey and the final chapter discusses

the implications for Rhode Island.
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CHAPTER II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Perhaps the most salient characteristic of social
legislation passed during the 1960's has been the expansion of opportunity for all Americans.

One of the least

controversial, and possibly one of the most profound in
terms of its impact on all workers, was the passage of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 which
proscribed discrimination in employment on the basis of
age against persons between the ages of 40 and 65. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA) added another

group of protected employees to those delineated in other
civil rights legislation, most notably Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination
in employment based on sex, race, color, religion and
national origin.
Historically, different categories of discrimination
have displayed distincitve characteristics both as to the
nature of the discrimination itself and the history of
legal responses to it. Although the ADEA is historically
linked to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it
has followed its own separate and distinct path. Section
715 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act directed the Secretary
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of Labor to study the problem of age discrimination and
report his findings to Congress.
The Department of Labor completed this report in
1965 and found that approximately half of all private
sector job openings were limited to applicants below age
55; similarly, persons above age 45 would not be considered for about one-fourth of all job openings. The
Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz,
discrimination was widespread,

concluded that age

and presented serious con-

sequences for older workers as individuals and the Nation's
economy. After careful study,

the Secretary concluded

that nonstatutory methods of dealing with age discrimination would not prove fruitful,

and that Congressional

action was warranted.
In January, 1967, President Johnson issued a call
for action to prohibit age discrimination in employment
during his Message on Older Americans. Less than one month
later, a bill was introduced to combat age discrimination
and on June 12, 1968, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (P.L. 90-202,

29 U.S.C. 621) became law.

Although President Johnson displayed concern for the
welfare of older Americans in many areas, his specific
concern over the employment prospects for older Americans
was prompted by the unemployment rate for older workers.
Historically, unemployment rates are highest for workers
younger than 25 years of age for many reasons. For example,
younger workers lack both seniority and the skills of
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many older workers.

Unemployment rates for workers through-

out the United States steadily decreases until workers
reach the age of forty-five, at which point employment
rates again begin to increase.

This trend has been evi-

dent since 1948 and is generally accurate for all workers .
Perhaps more important than the rate of unemployment is
the trend relative to the duration of unemployment for
older workers.

In 1967, nearly 25 percent of all unem-

ployed male workers older than 45 years of age were unemployed longer than fifteen

(15) weeks. 2

By contrast,

the 1976 duration of unemployment for all workers was
nearly 16 weeks, but the duration of unemployment for
workers 55 years and older was more than 23 weeks . 3

It

is important to note that statistics relating to unemployment for older workers must be considered conservative
estimates as many older workers faced with the prospect of
long-term unemployment will simply retire or drop out of
the labor force.

In addition,

recent nationwide studies

conducted in 1977 and 1978 at the National Opinion Research
Center clearly show that while few workers older than 50
years of age expected to lose their job within the next
year, over 50 percent thought they would experience difficulty in securing another job with commensurate pay and
benefits. 4
The distribution and severity of the unemployment
burden and the programs appropriate to deal with it are
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of obvious concern to policy makers and it is within
this context that the Congress considered the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Generally, the
act was designed to reduce two distinct elements in the
unfairness of prevailing hiring and firing practices.
First,

it attempted to end the discrimination that re-

sulted from a misunderstanding of the relationship between - age and job performance. Second, it attempted to
end the discrimination that resulted from a deliberate
desire or willingness to take advantage of a chronological
fact. Although originally passed in 1967, the act has been
amended in 1974 and 1978.
Among the original statement of findings and purpose,
Congress declared that older workers faced difficulty in
retaining jobs, securing employment once unemployed, were
subjected to arbitrary age limits in employment that worked
to the disadvantage of older workers; and in industries
affecting commerce, were subject to arbitrary discrimination in employment, burdening commerce and the free flow
of goods in commerce.

(ADEA,

Section 2(a)). The purpose

of the act was to:
"promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment."
(ADEA, Section 2(b)).
Generally,

the 1967 act made it illegal to fire or

to refuse to hire applicants solely because of age. Em-
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ployment agencies were forbidden to refuse to refer applicants to job openings because of age. The act all but
prohibited placing want ads specifying age preferences
and it forbade labor unions to exclude or expel people
from membership because of age. However, under Section
4(f)

the act did not prohibit hiring on the basis of age

when age was "a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business", or where the differentiation "is based
on reasonable factors other than age."

(1967 ADEA Sec-

tion 4(f)(l)). As an example of a bona fide occupational
qualification, a job advertisement calling for a child
actor for a youthful role in a movie or play would be a
legitimate advertisement. Also, a differentiation based
on reasonable factors other than age might involve an occupation where physical strength or other physical ability
is important to

the health and safety of the worker, as

in the case of air traffic controllers or law enforcement
officials. Section 4(f) of the original act outlined the
exceptions to the extent of coverage intended under the act,
and as might be expected, proved to be a source of confusion
between employees and employers, ultimately resulting in a
number of court cases and necessitating amendments to the
act,

One of the three exceptions provided under Section 4(f)

allowed employers to observe the terms of a "bona fide
seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan " ,
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such as a retirement or insurance plan, which is not "a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act, except that
no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to
hire any individual." (ADEA, Section 4(f)(2). Generally,
this provision,

initiated by New York Senator Jacob Javits,

was intended to allow for differential fringe benefits for
newly hired older workers. Javits' concern was prompted by
his belief that in the absence of this provision,

"employ-

ers might actually have been discouraged from hiring older
workers because of the increased costs involved in providing certain types of benefits to them. 115 Finally, the least
controversial exception, Section 4(f) (3), did not make it
unlawful for employees to be discharged or otherwise disciplined for good cause.
The original Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 also called for a study of the institutional and other
arrangements which encourage involuntary retirement,

to be

conducted by either the Department of Labor or by contract.
This study has not been completed, but is currently in
progress,
Originally, enforcement responsibility was given to
the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Aggrieved individuals were able to bring a civil
action in court against employers, as long as the employer
had twenty-five or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year .

The act also covered employment
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agencies and labor organizations. As originally passed,
the Act's coverage was extended to individuals at least
forty

(40) years of age but less than sixty-five (65) years

of age.
Since its passage, the Act has been amended in 1974
and 1978. The 1974 amendments (P.L.

93-259) expanded the

number of employees covered under the Act by including employees of a State or a political subdivision of a state.
In addition, the 1974 amendments also covered nondiscrimination on account of age in Federal government employment and
authorized the Civil Service Commission to enforce the provisions in the act relating to Federal Civil Service employment. Significantly, the coverage of the Act was revised
to include employers of twenty (20) or more employees, consistent with changes in the Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1974 (P.L.

93-259,

Section 28, enacted April 8,

1974).

Enforcement procedures are essentially similar to those
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, with the most significant
difference relating to the requirement that the Secretary
of Labor attempt to "eliminate discriminatory practices
through informal methods of conference, conciliation and
persuasion before instituting any legal proceedings. 116 All
covered employers, employment agencies and labor organizations are required to post, in a conspicuous place on the
premises, official notices outlining the rights of individuals covered by the Act.
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The 1978 Amendments to the Act

(P.L.

95-256) con-

tained a number of provisions extending the age group of
employees who are protected by the provisions of the Act.
Generally, the act prohibited the mandatory retirement of
workers under age 70 solely on the basis of age.

Two sig-

nificant exemptions were, however, allowed. First, it
permitted the compulsory retirement of "bona fide executives" or those in "high policymaking positions at age 65
where such executives have maintained their positions for
at least two years prior to retirement" and are entitled
to an "immediate, nonforfeitable retirement benefit from
their current employer's plan or plans of at least $27,000
annually, exclusive of their own contributions and Social
Security." (ADEA, Section 12(c)).Second, it allowed, until
June 30, 1982, the involuntary retirement of teachers at
age 65 where such individuals serve under contracts of unlimited tenure at institutions of higher education,

as

defined by Section 1201 of the Higher Education Act of 1965.
(ADEA,

Section 12(d)).

At this point it should be noted that the ADEA does not
preempt state law (Section

14(a)~.For

example, manditorily

retiring workers at age 70, although permitted under the
ADEA may violate a particular state's law prohibiting mandatory retirement at any age.

In fact,

a number of states -

Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevade, New Jersey, North Carolina,
and West Virginia - place no upper age limit on the retirement of older workers.

In addition, Alaska and Montana do
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not permit the bona fide pension plan exemption.
In Maine, public sector employees may not be forced
to retire solely because of age and Florida law contains
similar coverage for state employees.

Similar coverage was

extended to city workers by the cities of Los Angeles,
California and Seattle, Washington.
As a result of the Section 14(a) provision, the impact
of the 1978 amendments on companies which operate in the
above mentioned states is academic as state law supersedes
federal law when the state law allows a more liberal definition of retirement age.

In addition, companies that

operate in several states may be forced to abandon mandatory retirement as a matter of corporate policy.
In summary,

the ADEA of 1967, as amended through 1978,

covers workers age 40 to 70. The act covers all firms employing 20 or more persons and protects these workers from
arbitrary age discrimination in hiring, discharge, pay,
promotions, fringe benefits and other aspects of employment.
In addition, the Act's provisions also extend coverage to
labor organizations of 25 or more members, Federal, state,
and local government, and employment agencies that serve
covered employers, Enforcement responsibility for the ADEA
was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from the U,

S. Department of Labor on July 1,

as part of President Carter's Reorganization Plan No.

1979
1.

The law prohibits the involuntary retirement of workers
before age 70 in all but two cases. First, employees of at
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least 65 years of age serving in a bona fide executive
or high policy-making position and entitled to an annual benefit of $27,000 or more on retirement may be involuntarily retired.

In general, the definition of a bona

fide executive or high policy-making employee is intended
to cover the

head of a significant and substantial local

or regional operation of a corporation,

such as a major

production facility or retail establishment, but not the
head of a minor branch, warehouse or store.

7

In addition,

the head of a division such as finance, marketing, or
production and manufacturing at a corporate headquarters
would be included, as would top-level employees without
supervisory responsibilities such as chief economists or
chief research scientists of corporations.

8

The second exemption from the prohbition on mandatory
retirement permits, until July 1, 1982, the compulsory retirement of teachers between the ages of 65 and 70 who
have unlimited tenure at institutions of higher education,
as defined by Section 120l(a) of the Higher Education Act
of 1965. Effective September 30, 1978, the upper age limit
on the coverage of the Act for Federal employees was
removed,
Exemptions to the age requirement or limit fall
essentially into three broad categories. First, where age
is a bona fide job qualification, such as actors required
for youthful roles.

Second, where the age requirement is

part of a bona fide seniority system or employee benefit
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plan, except that mandatory retirement based on age is
prohibited until age 70. Generally, this exemption was
intended to allow age to be considered in funding a retirement benefit plan and to determine the level of
benefits to be paid.

It also permits an employer to ex-

clude a newly hired older worker from certain limited
fringe benefit plans where it would be too costly to fund
his or her anticipated benefit in the short time before
he or she reaches the upper age limit of the Act. Nothing
in the Act is designed to force employees to remain in
the workforce longer than they want to remain. For example,
pension plans which call for retirement based on a years
of service formula,

such as the "thirty years and out"

retirement system found in many manufacturing industries
are not directly affected by the Act.

Significantly, the

Act does not deal with the issue of voluntary retirement,
but is concerned with the issue of involuntary or mandatory
retirement. Forced retirements before age 70 are illegal,
except for the previously noted exemptions. Voluntary
separation from the labor force before age 70, for health
or other personal reasons,

is not affected by the Act.

Complaints are currently investigated by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) specialists who
attempt to reconcile such cases administratively, Where
such attempts prove unsuccessful, the EEOC may file court
action. Under Federal law, any person age forty years and
older, discriminated against on account of age by any em-
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player of 20 or more persons, labor organizations of 25
or more members, employment agencies serving covered employers or Federal, state and local governments may bring
a civil action in any Federal district court, and must
file a charge of unlawful discrimination with the EEOC and,
in states with an age discrimination law, with the state
agency responsible for the enforcement of that law. This
charge must be filed not less than 60 days before taking
court action and within 180 days of the alleged violation.
If the state takes action under its own discrimination law,
the 180 day restriction is increased to 300 days.
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved an important
procedural question of the ADEA which had created a conflict among the circuit courts of appeal.
v. Evans,

In Oscar Meyer

the Court ruled that alleged victims of dis-

crimination under the Act must first resort to State Administrative agencies, where available, before pursuing a
claim to the Federal level. These Federal claims can only
be filed after 60 days following the commencement of State
proceedings. The Court also resolved the issue of what
rights a claimant has if State jurisdictional requirements,
such as a time limit, cannot be met.

In such cases, the

Court reasoned, an individual's Federal rights remain intact, but the individual must make the potentially futile
act of filing a State claim.
The significance of this ruling lies in the fact that
enforcement of the ADEA rests, at least initially, with the

-17-

designated State agency. Until 1978, that responsibility
was charged to the R.

I.

State Department of Labor. How-

ever, under President Carter's Reorganization Plan No.

1,

administrative responsibility for the ADEA is now the
domain of the State EEOC, located in Rhode Island under
the Commission for Human Rights, as of September 30, 1980.
Under Rhode Island state law, age discrimination in
employment is covered under Title 28, Labor and Labor Relations, generally referred to as the State Fair Employment Practices Act
Chapter

28~5

(FEPA)

of 1956, as amended. In 1979,

of that Act was amended to include age in the

protected categories of race or color, religion, sex,
physical handicap or country of ancestral origin. Consistent with the Federal definition, the protected age groups
were constructed to include anyone between the ages of
forty

(40) and seventy (70), inclusive.
law~

In addition, state
ment Practices Act,
more individuals,

(Section 28-5-6,

(I) }.

as set forth under the Fair Employ-

includes all employers of four

(4) or

(Section 28-5-6 (B) ) thereby extending

coverage of the age discrimination provisions to a greater
number of workers than covered under Federal law. Although
employers of firms that employ four

(4) or more persons

but fewer than twenty (20) persons, who believe they have
been discriminated against on the basis of age, may bring
their complaint to the State Commission for Human Rights,
they would be precluded from filing a complaint to a
Federal court. Rhode Island State law also provides a more
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liberal definition of a labor organization, as there is
no provision specifically stating the size of the labor
organization.
In 1976, the U, S. Department of Labor estimated that
about 70 percent of all workers in the United States between the ages of 40 and 65 were covered under provisions
of the ADEA. 9 Despite Rhode Island's more liberal coverage,
the age discrimination provisions under state law are conservatively estimated to cover over 40 percent or approximately 80,000 men and women employed in Rhode Island
businesses and industries.

Coverage under the provisions of

Federal law is conservatively estimated to extend to approximately 12 percent of all employees or 12,000 workers.
These estimates are considered conservative as they assume
that all workers employed in businesses or industries with
fewer than 4 employees are in the protected age range of
40 to 70, an assumption that undoubtedly deflates the actual
number of workers covered under the legislation. Specific
breakdowns on the age of workers employed by firm size was
not available, and in the absence of these data,

the pre-

ceding estimates must be considered to represent the lower
boundary for the number of workers covered under age discrimination legislation.
In attempting to assess the impact of the Act since
its passage,

the U,

S. Department of Labor released figures

on the age discrimination complaints from 1969 to 1976, The
number of complaints received each year by the Secretary

-19-

rose from approximately 1,000 in 1969 to over 5,121 by
1976.10 This rise in complaints can be attributed to the
increase in the number of workers covered, a greater
awareness of the ADEA by workers, and insufficient economic growth in recent years to provide full employment and
its lingering effect on the older worker.
Generally, Rhode Island followed a similar trend with
respect to workers filing age discrimination cases. The
Rhode Island Department of Labor, which had jurisdiction
for employment of the law until September, 1979, reported
the following cases:

TABLE II-1
AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES FILED IN RHODE ISLAND
Fiscal Year
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79
1979-80*
1980-81 (to Sept.

Complaints

9'

1980)

5
6
1
22
22
24
9

*Enforcement transferred to State Commission for Human Rights
Source: R. I. Department of Labor, personal letter from
Armand DiOrio, Legal Officer
According to the Annual Report filed by the State Commission for Human Rights,

the agency has experienced a sig-

nificant number of charges filed on the basis of age. 11

In

addition, manufacturing industries accounted for almost half
of all age discrimination charges.
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During Congressional testimony concerning the impacts
of raising the age of mandatory retirement to age 70, a
variety of witnesses representing both the public and private sector raised a number of arguments either in favor of
or in opposition to increasing the age of mandatory retirement. While a lengthy analysis of the testimony is unwarranted, a discussion of the major arguments would be useful
in understanding the concerns of many witnesses.
Advocates in favor of leaving the age of mandatory retirement at 65 offered the following major arguments:
(1) older workers are, as a group, less suited for
some jobs because they typically have less education, declining physical and mental capacity,
are more resistant to change and do not learn
new skills as easily as do younger workers.
(2) medical science has yet to develop an effective
technique or set of techniques to guage the
physical and mental health of employees.
(3) mandatory retirement for all employees is evenhanded and treats all employees uniformly,
sparing unproductive older workers from the embarrassment of being fired or laid off.
(4) management is better able to plan its workforce
needs if it knows that workers will retire at a
certain age,
(5) older workers represent a more expensive workforce as employers must pay higher premiums for
health insurance, life insurance, pensions and
other fringe benefits.
(6) mandatory retirement creates new job opportunities

as well as advancement opportunities for younger
workers.
(7) older workers can receive social security or other
retirement income, while younger workers do not
have any other income.
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(8) compulsory retirement is easiest for management as it precludes the need for extensive
employee appraisal systems and reduces the
likelihood that workers will bring suit against
the company for age discrimination.
(9)

affirmative action goals will be more difficult
to achieve as workers will delay retirement,
thereby creating fewer employment opportunities.

Advocates in favor of increasing the age of mandatory
retirement from age 65 to age 70

or beyond, offered the

following arguments in their testimony to Congressional
subcommittees:
(1)

mandatory retirement based solely on age is discriminatory, contrary to equal employment opportunity and a violation of constitutional rights
concerning equal protection of the law.

(2)

chronological age alone is a poor indicator of
the ability of a person to be productive on the
job.

(3) enforced idleness brought about as a result of
retirement can have adverse psychological and
physical effects on older workers.
(4) mandatory retirement is based on misconceptions
about the ability of older workers to perform on
the job.
(5) mandatory retirement can cause financial hardships for older persons, particularly those older
workers who would like to continue working in
order to pay certain financial obligations usually
considered common for younger people, such as a
home mortgage, installment payments on cars and
their children's college tuition.
(6) forced retirement discriminates against many
women who have exhibited a discontinuous work
pattern, interrupted by home or child care
responsibilities, and who have not had the opportunity to become vested for pension benefits.
(7)

compulsory retirement increases the drain on the
social security system and private pensions by
forcing workers to participate in these systems
prematurely,
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(8) mandatory retirement is based on the myth that
older workers must make room for younger workers.
(9) forced retirement causes a reduced gross national
product through the loss of skills and experience
possessed by older workers.
(10) employer pension costs for older workers can be
reduced by restructuring or negotiating changes
in pension plans for older workers who work past
the "normal retirement age."
Thus, the arguments both for and against mandatory retirement,

to a large extent, seem to be reverse images of

each other. As a case in point, pension and fringe benefit
costs for older workers are undeniably higher than are these
same costs for younger workers. Proponents of eliminating
mandatory retirement would argue that this need not be the
case, as the pension and fringe benefit package available to
workers is a negotiable issue.

Congressional testimony by

representatives of the national AFL-CIO claimed that in fact
the issue of retirement age is one which should be left to
union and

management~

Similarly, but for different reasons,

businesses supported the position that retirement age not be
increased legislatively from age 65 to age 70, as business
was wary of the increased costs to their overall employee
benefit plan

programs~

Generally, it can be concluded that allowing workers to
remain on the job longer will reduce the real cost of a
pension. However, if pension plans are to differentiate between younger and older workers, the issue of where these
distinctions occur may lead to questions of a test of equal
benefits, a situation that may cause employees to press for
equal benefits at any age. Pensions, thrift plans or profit-
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sharing plans that give credit for service after age 65
in determining the amount of retirement income would only
result in modest overall increases to the cost of pension
plans. Significant costs to pension plans would result
when the plans provide hospital, surgical, medical, and
dental insurance, disability benefits and death benefits
for older workers as the costs of these insurance programs
invariably escalate when a worker reaches age 65. Costs of
such insurance dramatically increase for older employees
as the older worker is more likely to need the service,
and in the case of death benefit insurance, a claim is a

.
12
certainty at some point.
Thus businesses would inevitably be faced with the
difficulty of restructuring their employee benefit plans,
enforcing their employee appraisal systems more rigorously
and providing for effective employment planning, all without
the assistance of mandatory retirement.
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CHAPTER III
WHY FEWER OLDER PEOPLE WORK
The job market status of older workers is becoming
an increasingly important issue in our society. The older
population continues to grow in both number and proportion;
in part, because of longer average life spans and lower
bith rates, As the proportion of the retired population increases relative to the labor force, pressures will continue to mount on the resources of the two major retirement systems: Social

Security, already strained under a

sharp rise in both benefits and eligible persons; and
private pensions, which have been diminished by high rates
of inflation. Eventually, as the nation experiences a drop
in the rate of labor force growth, more older workers may
be required to remain in the labor force easing the pres.
' s retirement
.
sures on t h e nation
resources. 13

The labor force participation rates for older men have
decreased sharply during the past thirty years, with the
rate of decline increasing in recent years. The following
table shows the national civilian labor force participa tion rates for men age 55 to 64 and 65 years of age and
older, in percent:
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TABLE III-1
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATIONS RATES:
ANNUAL AVERAGEsl
Year

Age 55-64

1950
1960
1970
1978

Age 65 and Older

86.9
86.8

45.8%

83.0

26.8
20.5

73.5

33. 1

1 Percent of civilian noninstitutional population in the
civilian labor force.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training
Report £i the President, 1979, Table A-4, p. 240.
As the preceding table illustrates, there has been a
long-term decline in the participation rate of older males,
particularly among males age 65 and older. The participation
rate for men has fallen dramatically since 1961 when it became possible for men to retire early with actuarily reduced Social Security benefits.

In 1961, the Social Security

laws were amended to allow men to retire at age 62 with
permanently reduced benefits, an option that had been
available to women since 1956. The formula used in computing this reduction in the monthly benefit amount is a reduction of 5/9 of 1 percent for each month of retirement
before age 65. This means that if an individual retires
and elects to receive Social Security benefits as soon · as
he reaches age 62, he will receive a monthly benefit amount
that is 20 percent less than he would have received if he
had waited until age 65,

In an attempt to reverse the trend

toward early retirement, Congress added, in 1976, an
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additional provision in the Social Security legislation
for an increase in the monthly benefit amount of 1/12 of
1 percent for each month between ages 65 and 72 for which
an individual defers retirement. For those attaining age
62 after 1978, this increment will be increased to 1/4 of
1 percent.

14

Liberalized Social Security provisions have contributed to a decline in labor force participation for many
workers, particularly those age 62 and older. The following table displays the significant decrease in labor force
participation at age 62, when Social Security benefits
first become available to workers:

TABLE III-2
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES BY AGE GROUPS
Year
1957
1960
1970
1975

55-64
87 . 5
86 . 8
83.0
75 . 8

Men
62-64
82 . 9
81. 1
72 . 2
59 . 7

65+
3 7. 5
33 . 1
26.8
21. 7

Women
55-64
65+
34.5
10 . 5
37 . 2
10.8
4 3. 0
9.7
41. 0
8.3

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, "Raising the
Mandatory Retirement Age : Its Effect on the
Employment of Older Workers," Jun e 1978, p. 24.
Since 1960 , males have left the labor force in sizeable
numbers beginning at age 62 , when the previously mentioned
Social Security benefits first become available. This trend
is clearly to be expected , as Social Security serves as a
disin c entive to work .
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When Social Security legislation was first considered
in the early 1930's, prior to the passage of the Social
Security Act of 1935, the country was in the depths of the
Great Depression and Congress was grappling with the dual
issues of increasing job opportunities for unemployed young
workers, as well as with the issue of providing a retirement
income for older,

unemployed workers.

In searching for an

appropriate model for an income maintenance program.

the

Congress looked to the retirement programs then available in
Germany.
Nearly 100 years ago, Otto Von Bismarck, then First
Chancellor of the German Empire,

introduced legislation

which ultimately led to the first comprehensive plan of
social insurance in the Western world. Beginning in 1881,
German workers were covered under a national plan of workmen's accident insurance. In 1883, a comprehensive insurance program against illness was added, followed in 1884
by the passage of a comprehensive accident insurance program
for all citizens. Finally,

in 1889, a comprehensive in-

validity and old-age insurance program was passed. These
programs raised the need,

for the first time,

to define

"old age 11 • 15 Under the advice if his actuaries, Bismarck
selected the age of 65,

under the assumption that since the

average life expectancy in the 1880's was between 40 and 45
years of age,

few people would actually live to claim

benefits. Great Britain passed similar legislation in 1908,
initially restricting its benefit programs to workers age
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70 or over, but later reducing the age of eligibility
to 65.
Like the social insurance programs developed in Germany, the United States Social Security programs have
developed in a piecemeal fashion,

influenced by political,

economic and social considerations. The Social Security Act
of 1935 was the Federal government's first attempt at income maintenance on a sustained basis. 16 The Act established
retirement benefits for workers in commerce and industry
(except railroads). Initially, only retired workers age 65
and older were eligible. The basis for selecting age 65 as
the age of eligibility for retirement benefits was clearly
an arbitrary one. In fact,

former Secretary of Health, Edu-

cation and Welfare, Wilbur Cohen, one of the staff who
helped draft the 1935 Act has written:
"(T)his brief account of how age 65 was selected in
the old age insurance program in the United States
indicates that there was no scientific, social or
gerontological basis for the selection. Rather, it
may be said that it was the general consensus that
age 65 was the most acceptable age." l.]_/
In 1939, the Social Security program was amended to inelude a 50 percent benefit for spouses, and in 1940, compulsory coverage under the Act was extended to farm and
domestic workers,

farmers and other self-employed workers.

By 1956, women aged 62 to 64 became eligible for reduced retirement benefits and similar coverage was extended
to men by 1961. The principal group not included in the
Social Security system today are employees of the Federal
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government.

State or local government employees have the

option of participating in the system .
Since 1940, Social Security coverage has increased from
approximately 60 percent of the workforce to 90 percent of
all workers,

as illustrated in the following table:

TABLE III-3
SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE
Annual average
total paid
employment
(in thousands)

Year
1940
195 0
1960
1970
1975
Source:

46 .400
60,000
67,500
80 ,600
86,200

Employees
covered by
Social Security
(in thousands)

Coverage as
a percent of
employment

26,800
38,700
59,400
72,100
77,600

57.8%
64.5
88.0
89.5
90 .0

Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement, 1975. HEW Publication No. 77-11700, table 35,
p. 68 (Washington, D.C.: U .S. Government Printing
Office, 1977).

The dramatic rise in the number of employees covered by
the Social Security Act is further complicated by a concomitant rise in the percent of eligible workers electing to
retire at the earliest possible age. Simply stated, the total
numbers eligible to retire at 62 is not significant in and of
itself. However , since nearly half of all workers today are
electing to retire when Social Security benefits first become
available,

the financial burden placed on the Social Security

becomes readily apparent. The following table shows the
dramatic increase in the percent of eligible workers electing to take advantage of Old Age Survivors Insurance (OASI)
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at the minimum age of el ig i b ility.

TABLE III-4
PERCENTAGE OF INSURED WORKERS AGED 62 to 64
RECEIVING OAS! BENEFITS, SELECTED YEARS
1957-1976
BEGINNING OF YEAR
1957
1962
1963
1970
1974
1975
1976
Source:

Men
N/A
20%
29%
34%
44%
46%
49%

Women
16%
41%
45%
46%
54%
55%
56%

Social Security S ulletin, Annual Statistical
Supplement, 1975, Table 52, p. 85.

Nearly all retirement studies confirm the proposition
that higher Social Security benefits reduce labor force participation and the rapid growth and development of the system
has given early retirement a powerful impetus.

18

Since Social Security benefits were originally intended
to replace earnings lost through retirement and were not intended to be an old-age annuity,

recipients have always been

subjected to an "earnings test". In fact,

the 1935 legisla-

tion denied benefits to those with any earnings. However,
subsequent amendments altered the earnings test requirements.
For example,

in 1950 beneficiaries 75 years and older were

excluded from the earnings test. In 1954,

the exemption was

lowered to 72 and the 1977 amendments will remove, effective 1982,
rently,

the earnings test for everyone over age 70. Cur-

the earnings test reduces benefits by one dollar for
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each two dollars of earnin g s above an exempt base of
$5,000.
The earnings test, as applied to Social Security
beneficiaries, also functions as a disincentive to work
for retirees. Researchers have argued that the "true
marginal tax rate" on earned income above the $5,000 base
is well above the 50 percent reduction in benefits,

so

that a "middle income worker is hit with a tax rate of
over 70 percent. 11 19
A further incentive to retirement, and conversely a
disincentive to work, concerns the method chosen by
Congress to raise the benefits paid to beneficiaries. Prior
to 1972, Congress raised benefits periodically, In 1972,
Congress passed an automatic adjustment to reflect changes
in the cost of living. However, this automatic adjustment
plan had to be reformulated as the adjusted rate was keeping benefits well ahead of inflation. In fact,
to 1976,

from 1965

the consumer price index rose 80 percent, while

benefits increased 119 percent. In 1977, Congress modified
the adjustment plan to prevent adjustments from increasing
faster than the rate of inflation.
Although increased Social Security coverage and benefits are important,
force trends.

they do not fully explain the labor

In addition to increases in Social Security

coverage, disability and pension coverage has also expanded.

In 1956, disability insurance was incorporated

into the Social Security system, providin g benefits for
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disabled workers 50 and older. Subsequent legislation
added benefits for the dependents of disabled workers and
in 1960 protection was extended to disabled workers regardless of age. Poor health, regardless of the cause,
certainly inhibits both a worker's productivity and the
range of jobs available to that worker. Although the
general level of health among the population is improving,
as reflected in gains in the average life expectancy for
all Americans,

the percent of workers eligible to receive

Social Security disability benefits has also been increasing,

contributing at least in part, to lower labor force

participation rates for older workers.

TABLE III-5
PERCENTAGE OF MEN RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY BENEFITS
SELECTED YEARS Age 25-34
White Black

Year
1957
1960
1965
1970
1972

.05
.23
. 36
•4 7

Source:

.08
.45
• 72
.98

1957 to 1972

Age 35-44
Whi te Black
. 15
.73
1. 00
1. 15

.25
1. 41
2.01
2.30

Age 45-54
White Black
.26
• 72
1. 66
2. 3 3
2.81

.32
1. 18
3.16
4.38
5.22

Frederic Siskind, "Labor Force Participation of Men,
Age 25-54, by Race", Monthly Labor Review, July, 1975
pp. 40-42.

As the above table illustrates, older workers are more
likely to receive disability benefits than are younger
workers and black males have a disability rate nearly twice
that of white males. That health should be an important
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variable in labor force participation is an obvious, but
often overlooked, one. Between 1967 and 1977, the number
of persons receiving Social Security disability payments
more than doubled, with average monthly benefits increasing
from $117 million in 1967 to $752 million in 1977.20
The growth in private pensions has paralleled the
growth of the Social Security system, fostered in large
measure by the preferential tax treatment of employer's
pension contributions and a rise in p ension-fund earnings.
However,

in recent years the private pension system has

become increasingly threatened by a number of factors.

First,

Social Security payroll deductions are legislated to rise
from the current 6.13 percent of a taxable wage base of

$22,900 to 7.15 percent in 1987 with the wage base to be
icnreased automatically under the law on the basis of the
annual increase in average earnings in covered employment.
It has been projected that this taxable wage base will be

$42,600 in 1987.21
Increases in the cost of Social Security naturally
decrease the amount of disposable capital workers and employers have to invest,

thereby decreasing the attractive-

ness of private pension programs.

Second,

the General

Accounting Office has concluded that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) originally enacted
to protect employee pension plans, has actually contributed
to the termination of thousands of single-employer benefit
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pension plans. The study concluded that ERISA inhibited
the formation and continuation of private pension plans
by increasing the employer's reporting and disclosure responsibilities,

thus driving up the costs of maintaining

a private pension plan.
The third and perhaps most important threat to the
viability of private pension plans is the real or perceived
impact of inflation. During periods of either no inflation
or modest annual rates of inflation, the real value of
retirement income will remain constant. However, when inflation rises, fixed income groups whose money

income~

lag

behind increases in prices, are penalized as their real
incomes or standards of living decline. The following table
illustrates the real value of retirement income under alternative rates of inflation:

TABLE III-6
Real Replacement Rates After S, 10, lS and 20
Years of Retirement with Alternative Rates of Inflation
Years in
Retirement

No
Inflation

0

100
100
100
100
100

s
10
lS

20
Source:

3% Annual
Rate of
Inflation

S% Annual
Rate of
Inflation

10% Annual
Rate of
Inflation

100
86
74
64

100
78
61

100
62
39

48

2lf

SS

38

lS

Robert Clark, The Role £!. Private Pensions in
Maintaining Living Standards in Retirement
(Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association,
1977), p. 42.
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Thus, under periods of 10 percent inflation, a pension
will be reduced in five years to 62 percent of its value
and within seven years will be worth 50 percent of its
original value. The dramatic impact of inflation on pension
plans is further supported by the fact that many unionized
workers have "sought job security and health and pension
benefits in preference to immediate wage gains." 22
Unlike Social Security benefits, which are indexed to
price changes, many private pension plans do not offer
automatic cost of living increases. Thus inflation, or the
threat of inflation, may encourage workers to analyze their
retirement decision more fully than they have in the past
and more workers may elect to remain in the labor force
for longer periods of time.
The preceding discussion clearly suggests that the retirement decision, like much of human behavior,

is ordinarily

so complex that it cannot be adequately described or measured
by a single dimension. Several dimensions are usually necessary to describe or measure the retirement decision, among
them the availability of pension coverage and the age of
eligibility for benefits,

the health of workers and their

assumptions relevant to their ability to afford retirement.
In addition to these factors, withdrawal from the labor
force is also influenced by job satisfaction,

the number of

dependents workers have, the type of industry in which they
are employed, previous employment experience and the level
of unemployment in the local labor market. 23
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The questions of whether workers will continue to
retire at the "normal retirement age" gene rally assumed
to be 65 years old, or whether the trend to early retirement at age 62 will accelerate, remain constant, or be
reversed, will carry considerable impact for policymakers.
The appropriate policies selected will carry considerable
weight with respect to where the financial burden for
providing payments to those not in the workforce will
fall within society.
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CHAPTER IV
WILL OLDER WORKERS CONTINUE TO LEAVE THEIR JOBS

The rapid passage of the ADEA Amendments of 1978 was
characterized by very little opposition in either the House
or the Senate.

In fact, when the bill was originally

considered only four House members and seven Senators voted
against it.

During Congressional testimony,

the major focus

of the testimony concerned the issue of the right of older
workers to work unencumbered by an arbitrary age limit.
That the right to work is a civil right had been established
as long ago as 1914, where in Smith v. Texas,

the U.S.

Supreme Court held that the meaning of liberty included the
right to work.

A similar conclusion was reached in Truax v.

Raich (1915) where it was held that one of the intentions of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to guarantee the right to work.
The Fifth Amendment has also been interpreted by courts to
provide the right to work on the basis that the right to
obtain property assumes the ability to secure and maintain
employment.

Thus,

the stated intent of the legislation was

to remove a legal obstacle which prevented workers from
remaining in the labor force as long as they were both able
and willing to continue working.
The issue of the right to work as a civil right which
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should be guaranteed to all Americans was clearly the stated
goal of the legislation as expressed by both Congressman
Claude Pepper (D-Fla.),

the House proponent of the bill that

eventually became law, as well as by the Senate leader,
Jacob Javits

(D-NY).

Pepper summarized his feelings by stating:

"Our findings to date suggest that mandatory retirement
is discriminatory and socially unproductive.
It squanders
the talent of older people, and it strains an already
over-burdened Social Security system, and drives elderly
persons in so many instances into poverty and despair.
Mandatory retirement is a cruel camoflage masking age
discrimination and forced unemployment."24
Although many of his colleagues agreed with him in
principle,

the question of how many older workers would

choose to remain in the labor force, with the concominant
ramifications on the employment opportunities of younger
workers,

concerned many lawmakers.

In fact, Dr. Harold

Sheppard, director of the Center on Work and Aging of the
American Institutes for Research,

testified that many European

leaders were surprised that Congress was considering raising
the compulsory retirement age from 65 to 70,

in spite of our

relatively high unemployment, when many European countries with
similar unemployment rates were considering lowering their
retirement age to 60.25
Russo

Upon further questioning by Representative

(D-Ill.), Dr. Sheppard provided an answer typical of

many of the witnesses:
Mr. Russo:
Dr.

We have a problem (unemployment) right now.
Do you have any suggestions?
Sheppard:
We have a big youth employment program.
Let's give it some support.
We have a new
proposal to give incentives to the private
sector to hire more young with certain tax
credits or other kinds of incentives.
Let's
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make sure they do that.
There is also a very unsettled issue in
the field of labor economics.
There is one
argument that says there is the fixed lump
of labor supply and only so many jobs can
be handed around.
The other argument is that if you in
some way get more people employed in the
labor force, you get an increase in the
purchasing power, which increases the demand
for more people to be hired.
I frankly have to say I don't know
which one is right.
I don't like the first
It might be
one.
That is all I can say.
just a viseral reaction.
It is a way of not
meeting the problem.26
Dr.

Sheppard's comments reflect the views of many wit-

nesses who testified before the House Committee on Aging and
the Subcommittee on Retirement,

Income and Employment.

Comprehensive evidence, such as that found in many formal
studies, was not available.

Instead, witnesses relied on older

studies or public opinion polls in assessing the impacts of
increasing the age of mandatory retirement.

For example, many

witnesses and at least one Congressional Working Paper cited
a 1974 Harris Poll, conducted for the National Council on
Aging,

Inc.,

that found over 86 percent of those surveyed

agreed that "nobody should be forced to retire because of age,
if he wants to continue working and is still able to do a good
job."27

The Harris Study projected that there were about 4

million unemployed or retired older persons who would like to
work.

However,

this estimate was considered to dramatically

overstate the number of older workers that would be interested
in remaining in the labor force.

-40Senator Pell as ked the employment question of Donald
Elisburg, Assistant Secretary for Emp loyment Standards,
Department of Labor:
Senator Pell:
If this legislation passed, wh at would be
the impact, do you think most workers wo uld
stay on until they are 70 or 68?
Mr. Elisburg:
Well, Senator, we have estimated that
perhaps 175,000 workers might be involved.
Senator Pell:
In the whole United States?
Mr. Elisburg:
The effect on employment, from some
preliminary studies, of age 65 to 70, would
be a labor force impact of approximately two
tenths of 1 percent for men and one-tenth of
1 percent for women based on those reaching
age 65 who would prefer to stay on the job.
It is reasonable that large numbers of
employees who would normally be eligible to
retire at age 65 would continue to retire
at age 65.28
In preparing this estimate, the Department of Labor relied
on two documents:

(a) the Social Security Administration's

Survey .2..f Newly Entitled Beneficiaries (SNEB), and,

(b) the

Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted by the Bureau of
the Census.
The Survey of Newly Entitled Beneficiaries (SNEB), conducted by Virginia P. Reno in March 1972, indicated that 11
percent of the men and 7 percent of the women in the sample
would have chosen to continue working beyond their compulsory
retirement age.

Wh en the CPS Report's population projections

are combined with 1970 labor force participation rates for 64
year olds,

there would be an estimated 2,483,000 men and

1,458,000 women aged 65 to 69 in the labor force in 1985.
If the increase suggested by the SNEB of 11 percent for men
and 7 percent for women was calculated, the labor force would
be increased by 273,000 men and 102,000 women, accounting for
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an increase of .35 percent.29

This estimate was considered

excessively high, as it assumes that everyone who wanted to
work past age 65 would continue to work until age 70.
The Department of Labor submitted written comments in
answer to Senator Pell's question and stated that "a judgemental
figure of 200,000 was arrived at by considering the estimated
number of workers involuntarily retired through pension plan
requirements or other reasons. 11 30

Other evidence in support

of this conclusion was offerred by the Department of Labor
which observed that the "U.S. labor force does not expand on
a one-out, one-in" basis.31

The Department noted that indus-

tries and firms experience different economic conditions and
will respond by increasing or reducing their labor force as
needed.

Thus, because a worker retires, there is no automatic

movement to hire a new worker, as employers may be reducing
their workforce through attrition.

Conversely, some employers

may be expanding their workforce even though no workers are
retiring.

The Department concluded that the fact that older

workers remain in the labor force cannot be considered an
obstacle to entrance into or mobility within the labor force
for younger workers.
The Department also concluded that historical trends toward
early retirement were not likely to be reversed in the shortrun and that Social Security and private pensions were powerful
disincentives to work.

These trends, already noted in the

preceeding chapter, existed across the board for both salaried
and hourly employees in all industries and it was reasoned that
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older employees, as long as they remained productive,

should

not be forced out of the workforce to make room for younger
workers.

The Department summarized its conclusions by stating,

"(O)ne cannot program the older worker to a reduced retirement
income and inactivity as the means to achieve promotion for
others.

This would be robbing one generation to pay another.

11

32

Other testimony before the House Select Committee on
Aging from various representatives of corporations clearly
supported this view.

General Motors and the Ford Motor Corpor-

ation indicated that only 2 percent of hourly workers worked
until the mandatory retirement age of 68 and that 89 percent
of their employees retired before age 65.

Exxon reported that

about one out of five employees waited until the mandatory
retirement age of 65

to retire and General Foods reported a

similar percentage of workers retiring at the mandatory retirement age.

Representatives from IBM claimed that since 1970,

fewer than 20 percent of its 7,000 retireees waited until age
65, and in 1976, 84 percent of its employees retired before
age 65.
In summary,

testimony before Congress from industry

representatives,

researchers and the Department of Labor

supported the trend toward early retirement and offerred no
conclusive evidence that the impact on job opportunities for
younger workers would be extensive.
At this point it should be noted that the studies cited
in the literature, as well as in Congressional testimony,
concerning the impacts of increasing the age of mandatory
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retirement shared a number of similar characteristics.

Like

the study conducted by Reno, much of the information was
dated.

For example, a study conducted by Herbert Parnes at

Ohio State University, "The Pre-Retirement Years:

A Long-

itudinal Study of the Labor Market Experience of Men ," was
completed in 1971 and concluded that about 8 percent of the
men surveyed who were mandatorily retired wanted to work longer.
The Parnes' study used the worker as the "unit of analysis,"
as did the Reno study.

Although testimony from representatives

of major corporations was heard, there were no studies which
used the employer as the "unit of analysis," and if such
research had been available, it would have offerred a valuable
perspective on the question of the impacts of increasing the
age of mandatory retirement.
However , since the passage of the 1978 Amendments to
the ADEA, at least two additional studies have been completed,
one by Portland State University researchers Lois Copperman,
Douglas Montgomery and Fred Keast , and another by researchers
at the Bureau of Natio nal Affairs (BNA).

The Portland State

researchers, using both mail and telephone survey approaches,
were able to obtain surveys from nearly 2,000 firms for their
1979 study.

While the study examined the potential impact of

the amendments on the employment opportunities of women, youth
and minorities,

it also considered the impact on pension systems,

the probable impact of inflation on pensions, and the possible
extension of worklife for older workers.
One of the major findings of the Portland State Study was
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that employers did not expect historical trends toward early
retirement to be reversed. 33

However, employers believed that

continuing high rates of inflation would alter worker's
perceptions of the desirability of early retirement.
researchers believe that,

The

in the long run, labor force partic-

ipation rates for older workers would increase and that by the
year 2000 firms will be increasingly more reliant upon older
workers, suggesting that the key issue in labor recruitment
will be the "selective retention of those who could realistically
choose to end their work life.

11

34

A second major conclusion of the study, and in many ways
related to the preceeding observation, will be the increasing
importance of an employer's performance appraisal system.

With

the increase in the age of mandatory retirement, mar g inally
productive workers, who would have been retired under the for mer
age ceilin g of 65 might want to work until a g e 70.

Businesse s

would be faced with the decision of allowin g a marginally
productive older worker to continue workin g or to terminate
that employee.

While firms may have been willin g to allow a

marginally productive 64 year old employee to work one more
year to age 65, it is unlikely that firms will allow unproductive
older workers to work until they are 70.

Therefore, it is

quite likely that personnel appraisal practices will begin to
examine productivity of older workers more critically.

If this

observation is accurate, it would represent an ironic twist,
as t h e overriding concern of the legislation was to encourage
the participation of older wor k ers in t h e wor k force.
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The third major finding concerned the importance of the
size of the firm to the applicability of the ADEA amendments.
Respondents representing firms of over 250 employees almost
universally acknowledged the legislation's direct application
to their companies, while those respondents representing
smaller firms,

especially those with fewer than 100 employees,

saw their companies as being affected with less frequency.
Although the survey results did not,

in general,

suggest that

firms expected the ADEA Amendments of 1978 to have a major
impact,

the effect of the ADEA Amendments was

expected to be

greatest for certain sectors of the economy, as well as by
firm size .
Perhaps the most important conclusion of the study, at
least in terms of its implications for Rhode Island,

concerned

the impact of continued high rates of inflation on the retirement decision of workers .

Responses from New England indicated

that nearly 43 percent of the firms surveyed believed that
under continuing high rates of inflation, workers would most
.
.
.
. bs
in
t h eir
JO
1 i. k e 1 y remain

35
.
past t h e norma 1 re t irement
age .

The frequency of this response was predicted to be fully 30
percent above the national average .

To the extent that the

Rhode Island economy mirrors the New England economy, the
long-term implications on employment prospects, in terms of
both internal mobility and job opportunities, could be seve re .
However,

in an extensive analysis of the influence of the

ADEA on job opportunities for women, youth and minorities,
the study concluded that the larger the size of the establishment, the more likely employers are to view the amendments as
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reducing job opportunities for these groups .
immediate future,

Thus, in the

the study concluded that the larger firms,

because the "criteria for hiring tends to be more objective
and impersonal than those of smaller firms" are likely to
retain older workers.36
In attempting to guage the implication of the conclusion
contained in the study for the Rhode Island labor force,
final conclusion must be highlighted.
found that the older the labor force,

In general,

one

the researchers

the less likely the amend-

ments were viewed as reducing job opportunities for youth,
minorities and women.
aged" workers

However, as the proportion of "middle-

(ages 40-59) increased,

the amendments were viewed

as reducing job opportunities for both women and minorities.
This conclusion suggests that firms with older workforces
fully expect these older workers to retire, thereby creating
employment opportunities within the firm and that the "younger"
the workforce,

that is,

those firms which have few workers

of retirement age, expect to see fewer job opportunities.

While

this conclusion seems obvious, it does suggest that many
employers foresee a period of slow economic growth where there
will be fewer job opportunities as a result of conditions
within the economy and not as a result of policy changes in
the age of retirement.
The second recent study, conducted by the Bureau of
National Affairs (BNA) in August 1979,
267 organizations.

In this survey,

involved a survey of

the BNA solicited the

opinions of personnel representatives from both large and
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small firms involved in manufacturing, nonmanufacturing and
nonbusiness organizations.

More than 51 percent of the employ-

ers reported "very little impact" from the changes in the
ADEA legislation, with another 35 percent "feeling no impact. 1137
However,

21 percent of the employers did find an increase in

the number of employees electing to postpone retirement past
the "normal retirement age."

Many of the respondents were

unable to specify the exact increase, although a number did
describe it as "slight, minute, small or minimal."38

Two

survey participants reported more detailed findings, as a
Minnesota medical center claimed "100 percent of those eligible
to retire at 65 have elected to stay on at least part-time,"
and an eastern government agency reported that of those now
retiring,

"5 percent" are older than 65 years of age. 39

The survey confirms the findings of the researchers at
Portland State university,

and the testimony of Congressional

witnesses relative to the initial impact of the legislation.
Although few retirement age workers are remaining in the labor
force,

the BNA study found many employers still feel the overall

impact of the legislation is yet to be determined.

Perhaps

the most immediate impact has been on the personnel departments of many large firms now faced with a need to determine
the individual retirement decisions of workers, as well as
to develop more complete performance appraisal systems.

The

BNA survey identified a wide range of responses to the approaches of many firms on the adjustments that many companies are
making to accomodate their older workers.
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CHAPTER V

ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEA

The policy implications of most legislative actions are
difficult to completely anticipate.

Social legislation, by

its very nature ,

is complex to evaluate because it seeks to

change behavior.

Viewed within this context , social legis-

lation will usually stand in direct contradistinction to
many existing traditions currently embraced throughout society.
Clearly,

the historical forces toward early retirement, which

have virtually made early retirement a social goal, will not
be completely reversed in the short run.
The retirement decision is a very complex and personal
While a worker ' s

decision for both employers and employees.

job performance is undoubtedly a critical variable in this
relationship, a worker ' s financial resources are no less
important .

Historical patterns toward early retirement have

developed during an era characterized by increases in worker
productivity and low rates of inflation.

In essence, these

forces are closely intertwined in a complex set of relationships only briefly delineated in this paper.
The research objectives that guided this policy analysis
were intended to measure the short-term impacts of the
legislation on job mobility for younger workers, women and
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minorities and to measure the long-term impacts on the
retirement decision of workers under the assumption of continuing high rates o f inflat i on .

To accomplish these objectives,

a mail survey was conducted of 107 manufacturing firms located
in the state of Rhode Island.

The sampling plan involved a

stratified sampling methodology of firms involved in the
production of goods from SIC Code 20 to 39, excluding SIC 21
and 29 . , (See Appendix A, Survey Instrument,
Postcard,

Introductory

Introductory Letter and Followup Letter)

The survey instrument was administered during the month
of February 1981 using the three-step methodology delineated
in Appendix B .

(See Appendix B,

Survey Methodology)

About

one week a f ter the post cards were mailed, the surveys were
sent out .
mailed,

During the third week,

the followup letter was

extending the survey schedule to three weeks.

Results

were then punched onto cards and tabulated using the Statistical
Package for Social Scientists (SPSS).
The response rate for the survey was excellent .

Of the

107 surveys mailed, 83 were returned providing a 79 percent
response rate .

The high response rate for this survey, while

difficult to pre c isely i dentify , seems attributable to the
methodology employed as well as to a particularly fortunate
event.

During the week the surveys were mailed,

"The Prov-

idence Evening Bulletin" ran a front page article (February

12 , 1981) entitled "Mandatory Pension Plans , Older Retirement
Report" which discussed the findings of the President ' s Commission on Pension Policy and highlighted the proposed changes
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in retirement policy.

Although it is difficult to measure

the influence of such an unanticipated event,

the article

is mentioned because it may have contributed to the high
response rate.
The responses displayed in the following table indicate
that four SIC codes

(20,

coverage a s all six (6)
their surveys.

26,

28 and 39)

reported 100 percent

firms in those industries returned

No SIC code reported under 50 percen t

coverage.

The fir ms included in the sample employed over 12,400 people
or approximately 10 percent of the total manufacturing workforce of Rhode Island.

TABLE V-1
Completed Surveys .£y_ SIC Code
SIC Title
Food and Kindred Products
Textile Mill Products
Apparel and Other Textile Products
Lumber and Wood Products
Furniture and Fixtures
Paper and Allied Products
Printing and Publishing
Chemicals and Allied Products
Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products
Leather and Leather Products
Stone, Clay and Glass Products
Primary Metal Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Machinery, Except Electrical
Electric and Electronic Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Instruments and Related Products
Miscellaneous Manufacturing

Completed
Surveys

SIC Code
20
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

6

4
4
4
3
6
5

6

4
5

4
4
4
4
4
5

4
6
Total

83
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Perhaps the most significant observation that can be
made about the survey respones is that there was a remarkable homogeneity in the distribution of mu c h of the information .
The following table clearly illustrates this point, as there
was virtually no difference in the responses to the survey
by small, medium and large firms .

While the original sampling

plan was designed to include one-third of the sample from
small, medium and large firms , the survey results cl os ely
parallel this distribution .

TABLE V-2
Av e rage Employment of Surveyed Firms
Firm Size

Number
4 to 19 employees
20 to 99 employees
100 or more
Total

Percent

25
31

30.1%
37.4
32 . 5

27

83

Firms employing 100 or more workers represented nearly
one-third of the total sample, while small firms employin g
between 4 and 19 workers represented a slightly smaller total .
Firms with 20 to 99 workers represented the
of survey r esponses.

great~st

number

Thus, the distribution o f survey

responses closely parallels the original sampling plan wi nh out
a great deal of variation.
The distribution of firms by the nu mb er of years they have
been in business displays more variation.

As the next table

illustrates, firms with less than 5 years in business represent
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the smallest proportion, as only 4 percent of the total is
comprised of this group.

The largest group, comprisin g

elmost one out of three firms, was represented by firms with
between 26 and 50 years in business.

This question was

included with the expectation that it would serve as an
indicator of the age distribution of the labor force of the
firms included in the sample.

TABLE V-3
Years in Business for Surveyed Firms

less than 5 years
6 to 10 years
11 t o 25 years
26 to 50 years
more than 50 years
No response

Number

Percent

3
12
20
27
20

3.6%
14.5
24.1
32.5
24.1
1•2

1

Total

83

The information presented in Table V-3 shows that
47 firms or 57 percent of the sample have been in business
for more than 25 years,

suggesting that the sample contains

a significant number of firms which should also have large
numbers of older workers.
Table V-4 displays information with regard to the
past policies ori mandatory retirement for the firms included
in the sample.

As the table illustrates, nearly 16 percent

of the firms in the sample had a mandatory retirement age
for employees.
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TABLE V-4
Mandatory Retirement Policies
Question:

In 1977, did your firm have a mandatory retirement age for any of its workers?
Number
Yes
No

Percent
15.7%
84.3

13
70
Total

83

Significantly, mandatory retirement policies are strongly
associated with the size of the firm's workforce.
may seem an obvious conclusion,

While this

the firms included in the

sample clearly show that as the size of the firm increases,
the incidence of mandatory retirement age policies also
increases.

The following table shows the relationship

between the size of the firm and the incidence of mandatory
retirement policies.

TABLE V-5
CROSSTABULATION
Mandatory Retirement Policies
Mandatory
Retirement
Policy

4-19

.£y Firm Size

20-99

Firm Size
100 or more

Total

Yes
No

1
24

3
28

9
18

13
70

Total

25

31

27

83

Note :
x 2 = 9.79*
*Significant at .01
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Additional analysis of the distribution of mandatory
retirement policies by firms producing durable goods
24,

25, and 32 through 39) and non-durable goods

(SIC

(SIC 20,

22, 23 and 26 through 31) did not indicate any relationship
between mandatory retirement policies and these SIC categories.
Retirement age policies were applied to both white collar
workers and blue collar workers,

although three respondents

with mandatory retirement age policies did not subject
white collar workers to the same retirement policies as were
blue collar workers.

White collar workers were most likely

to be madatorily retired at age 65, evidence of the institutionalization of age 65 as the normal retirement age.

TABLE V-6
Retiremen t
Question:

~

for White Collar Workers

At what age were white collar workers mandatorily
retired?
Number
Age 65
No retirement age
Total

10
3

Percent

77
23

13

Retirement age policy for white collar workers was
predominate l y determined by the pension or profit sharing
plan offerred by the company or by company policy .

Relatively

few white collar workers were subject to a mandatory retirement policy that was collectively bargained, a finding
consistent with the fact that many white collar workers are
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not unionized.

TABLE V-7
How Was This Retirement Age Determined
Question:

Was this mandatory retirement age part of a:
Percent

Number
Pension or profit sharing plan
Company policy
Collectively bargained union contract
Both pension and company policy
Both company policy and collectively
bargained
Don ' t Know or No Response
Total

3
4
1
2

23
31
8
15

2
1

15
8

13

Firms with a mandatory retirement age in 1977 all
required blue collar workers to retire at age 65 .

No other

ages were identified for blue collar workers .

TABLE V-8
Retirement
Question:

~

for Blue Collar Workers

At what age were blue collar workers
retired?

Age 65
Other ages

Number

Percent

13

100

0
Total

mandat~rily

0

13

In addition to not having an alternative retirement age,
blue collar workers were also more likely to have had their
retirement age established as part of a collectively bargained
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union contract.

The following table indicates how the retire-

ment age for blue collar workers was established.

TABLE V-9
How Was This Retirement
Question:

~

Determined

Was this mandatory retirement age part of a:
Number

Pension or profit sharing plan
Company policy
Collectively bargained union contract
Both pension and company policy
Total

3
4
4
2

Percent

23
31
31
15

13

Since the passage of the ADEA Amendments of 1978, firms
which previously had mandatory retirement policies have
modified their retirement policies.

As might be expected,

most firms simply substituted age 70 for age 65.

The

following table displays information on how the firms surveyed
responded to the changes legislated in 1978.

TABLE V-10
How Firms Have Modified Their Retirement Age
Question:

How have you modified, or how do you intend to
modify the mandatory age in order to comply with
the changes in retirement age policy?
Have you
or will you:
Number

Increase to age 70
Increase to past age 70
Abolish it entirely
Leave the age unchanged
No Response

9
0
1
1
2

Total

13

Percent
70
0
8
8
15
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Nearly 70 percent of the firms with a mandatory retirement policy simply increased the age of retirement to 70
years of age.
and one firm,

Only one firm completely abolished the age
in apparent violation of the law, has not

changed its mandatory retirement age.
Significantly, a majority of firms with a mandatory
retirement age policy believe that employees would choose
to work past age 65.

Nearly 70 percent of the firms believe

that some employees would extend their worklife, as displayed
in the following table.

TABLE V-11
Do You Expect Employees .!_£ Work Past Age
Question:

&2

In the next few years do you expect any of your
employees to choose to work past the age of 65?
Number
Yes
No
Not Sure

9
2
2

Total

Percent
70
15
15

13

When questioned further about whether any specific
group or groups of employees would be more likely to work
longer, employers responded with less certainty.

The following

table summarizes the responses of employers to the question
of whether certain groups of employees will work longer.
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TABLE V-12
Will Certain Groups Work Longer
Question:

Do you expect any particular group of your
employees to work longer than other groups?
Number
Yes
No
Not Sure

Percent
46
31
23

6
4
3

Total

13

Significantly, no respondent felt that blue collar
workers,

defined as craft workers, laborers, operatives or

service workers, were likely to extend their worklife.
is significant because in manufacturing industries,

This

the majority

of the workforce is employed in blue collar occupations.
However , white collar workers,

particularly executives, were

expected to continue working past age 65.

Other groups of

employees were expected to remain in the workforce and the
following table displays the expected distribution.

TABLE V-13
Groups Expected .!.!?_ Remain in the Workforce Past Age &2_
Question:

Which particular group do you expect to work longer?
Number

Executives
Man agers
Technical workers
Clerical workers
Blue collar workers
Executives and sales workers
Technical and clerical workers

Percent

3
1
0

37.5
12.5

1

12.5

0
1
1

12. 5
12.5

0
0
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Generally,

respondents believed that white collar

workers were more likely to remain in the workforce for
longer periods of time .

Again,

this conclusion could have

been anticipated as white collar jobs are generally less
physically demanding than are many blue collar occupations.
In contrast to the 13 firms that had a mandatory retirement age for their employees in 19 7 7,

70 firms did not

mandatorily retire workers.

50 f i rms or 71 percent

In fact,

of those firms without a mandatory retirement age policy in

1977 im dicated they previously had workers remain past age
65 .

The following table illustrates the distribution of

firms which did not mandatorily retire workers.

TABLE V-14
Firms Which Allowed Workers to Work Past Age
Question:

£2

Have you previously had any employees work
past age 65?
Number
Yes
No
Not Sure
No Response
Total

Percent

50
17
1

24

71

2

3

1

70

A significant number of firms had neither a mandatory
retirement age policy nor any experience with workers remaining in the workforce beyond age 65, suggesting the powerful
influence of age 65 as the normal retirement age for workers .
The information in the above table clearly supports the long-
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term trend for workers to leave the labor force at age 65,
as nearly one firm in four, without the artifical constraint
of a formal retirement age, has not had any workers remain
past age 65.
When the employers who did have workers remain past age
65 were asked to indicate what percent elected to work longer,
fully 70 percent claimed that no more than 10 percent remained
past age 65.

The following table illustrates the distribution

of workers that have remained past age 65.

TABLE V-15
Percent of Workers Age &2_ Who Have Kept Working
Question:

Approximately what percent of your employees
who reached 65 elected to work longer?
Number

1 to 10 percent
11 to 25 percent
26 to 50 percent
51 to 75 percent
76 to 100 percent
Don't Know

35
2
3
1
3
3
Total

Percent
70
4
6
2
6
6

50

Interestingly, some employers indicated that workers in
certain specialized crafts,

such as molder and coremakers,

were encouraged to work longer because it was difficult to
find younger workers with equivalent skills.

Other employers

noted that many older workers have better work habits and
productive capability than do younger workers and these older
workers are encouraged to remain as long as they are physically

-61-

capable of working.

The 6 firms that indicated that between

76 and 100 percent of their workforce had remained past age

65 were closely examined but did not display any distinctive
characteristics that would help explain why such a large
percentage of workers remained past age 65.
When employers were asked whether any group of their
workers would remain in the workforce past age 65,

they

responded with a comparable but higher percentage distribution
than did employers that did not have any workers remain past
age 65.

As indicated in the following table, 46 percent of

employers with a mandatory retirement policy believed that
certain groups would remain in the workforce.

The next table

illustrates how employers who did not have a mandatory retirement policy and, hence, have had experience with workers
remaining past age 65, expect workers to participate in the
labor force.

TABLE V-16
Will Certain Groups Work Longer
Question:

Do you expect any group of your employees to
want to work longer than others?
Number
Yes
No
Not Sure
Total

Percent

31

44

34

49

5

7

70

As ·· the table illustrates, 44 percent of employers without
a mandatory retirement age for their workers expect certain
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groups to remain in the workforce.

When combined with the

information provided by employers that had a mandatory retirement age policy, nearly 45 percent of all employers expect
some workers, as a group,

to remain in the labor force beyond

age 65.
In speculating which groups of workers would be expected
to work longer , employers without a mandatory retirement age
policy fully anticipate that executives would most likely
want to remain past age 65 .

This conclusion is consistent

with the expectation of firms which did have a mandatory
retirement age policy .

While the 1978 ADEA Amendments required

mandatory retirement at age 65 for chief executives of a
company , specifically those in the upper echelons eligible
for an annual pension in excess of $27,000, not all executives
are affected .

Thus , the finding that many executives will

remain past age 65 is con s idered significant as competition
for these positions from younger workers is likely to intensify
in the years ahead.

The following table shows the frequency

with which respondents predicted that executives would work
past age 65.
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TABLE V-17
Groups Expected
Question:

~

Remain in the Workforce Past

~

.§.2.

Which particular group do you expect to work
longer?
Number

Executives
Clerical workers
Blue collar workers
Sales workers
Executives , managers and technical
Executives , managers, technical and
clerical
Executives , managers and sales
Executives and managers
Executives and blue collar workers
Managers and blue collar workers
Managers , technical, clerical and blue
collar
All workers
Total

Percent

7
2
6
1
2

20.0
2.8
17.0
2.8
5. 7

3
1
6
1
1

8 .5
2.8
17.0
2.8
2.8

1
1

2.8
2.8

35

In addition to the large number of responses predicting
that executives will work past age 65, managers,

technical

workers and clerical workers are all expected to work past
age 65.

Significaat numbers of blue collar workers are

expected to remain in the workforce, unlike the finding of
employers with retirement age policies,

possibly a result

of the fact that employers who did not have a mandatory
retirement age policy have had experience with older workers
remaining past age 65, and are in a better position to
identify which groups of workers are likely to remain past
age 65.

When taken together, 42 employers or approximately

51 percent of all those surveyed felt that some groups of
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employees were likely to remain in the workforce past age

65.
The foregoing questions were primarily concerned with
identifying the previous experience employers have had with
mandatory retirement policies.

The next section of the

questionairre asked employers to estimate the impacts they
expected from the changes brought about by the 1978 ADEA
Amendments and their opinion of the proposed changes.
Employers were first asked whether mandatory retirement
will be abolished nationally,

in an attempt to guage both

their expectations about the future of mandatory retirement
and the potential impacts of increasing the age beyond age 70.

TABLE V-18
Will Mandatory Retirement Be Abolished
Question:

Nationally, do you expect mandatory retirement
to be abolished entirely?
Number
Yes
No
Not Sure
No Response

Percent

45
26
11
1

Total

55
32
13
1

83

As the table illustrates, over 50 percent of all
employers believe that mandatory retirement will be abolished.
When combined with information from the next table,

it can

be concluded that not only do the majority of employers
expect mandatory retirement to be abolished, but they do
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not expect the abolition of mandatory retirement to have a
significant impact on their firm.

TABLE V-19
Affect of Abolishing Mandatory Retirement
Question:

If the mandatory retirement age were to be abolished
entirely, what affect would it have on your company?

Great Affect
Moderate Affect
Some Affect
Little Affect
No Affect
Don't Know

Number

Percent

2
5
8
26
35

2.4
6.0
9.6
31. 3
4 2. 2
8.4

7

83

Total

Only 18 percent of the respondents believed that abolishing
mandatory retirement would have any substantial impact on their
companies.

The overwhelming majority believe that removing the

upper limit for workers would have little or no impact on their
company.

To a large extent, this conclusion is supported by the

fact that relatively few firms

(13 or 16 percent) had a mand-

atory retirement age policy in 1977.

Thus,

"u ncapping " the

age of retirement does not pose any substantial threat to most
employers.
However,

firms with a mandatory retirement age in 1977 were

more likely to predict that abolishing mandatory retirement
woul d have a significant impact .

This could have been antici-

pated, as those firms with a mandatory retirement age have not
had the experience of allowing older workers the option of
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workin g lon g er.

Thus,

the y ar e not sure of wh at the demand

to work lon g er will be.

The next table displays this re-

lationship.

TABLE V-20
CROSSTABULATION
Retirement Policy E_y Affect if Abolished
Affect if
Abolished

Mandatory Retirement
Policy

Great, Moderate
Some

Little, None
Don't Kno w

Yes

7

6

No

8

62

15

68

Total

Note:
x 2 = 13.32*
*Significant at .01
In attempting to guage the age of retire ment for both
white collar and blue collar workers, and therefore the
potential i mpact of abolishing the age of mandatory retirement,

respondents were asked to indicate what percent of

white collar and blue collar workers retire before age 65.
Over 5 out of every 8 employers claim that less than 10
percent of their white collar workers retire before age 65.
While nearly 25 percent of the respondents were unable to
provide an estimate to this question,

it seems clear that

relatively few white collar workers retire before a g e 65.
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TABLE V-21
White Collar Workers that Retire Before Age ..§2_
Question:

Regarding employees who presently retire prior
to age 65, approximately what percentage of
your white collar (professional, technical,
managers and administrators, sales workers and
clerical) workers retire prior to age 65?
Number
None
1 to
11 to
26 to
51 to
7 6 to
Don ' t

38
18
3

10 percent
25 percent
so percent
75 percent
100 percent
Know

4
()

1
19
Total

Percent
45.8
21. 7
3.6
4.8
0
1. 2

83

In contrast to the distribution of retirement age
for white collar workers , blue collar workers are

~ ore

likely

to retire before age 65 than are white collar workers.

TABLE V-22
Blue Collar Workers that Retire Before Age ..§2_
Qu e stion:

Regarding your blue collar workers (craft workers,
operatives , laborers and service workers) what
percentage retire prior to age 65?
Number
None
1 to
11 to
26 to
51 to
76 to
Don ' t

10 percent
25 percent
50 percent
75 percent
100 percent
Know
Total

26
22
5
5
4
3
18
83

J'_~_i;: cent

31. 3
26 . 5
6.0
6.0

4.8
3.6
21. 7
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While 56 employers claimed that less than 10 percent
of their white collar workers retired before age 65, 48
employers claimed that less than 10 percent of their blue
collar workers retired before age 65.

Blue collar workers

were more likely than white collar workers to retire before
age 65 in nearly every percentage category.

The following

crosstabulation suggests that early retirement, before age
65, is more likely for blue collar workers.

TABLE V-23
CROSSTABULATION
Early Retirement
by
White Collar and Blue Collar Workers
Less than
10 Percent
White Collar workers
56

More than
10 Percent
8

Total
64

Blue Collar workers

48

17

65

Total

104

25

129

Note:
x2 = 3.85*
*Significant at .05
Thus, early retirement before age 65 seems to be more
common for blue collar workers.

Again, this conclusion is

consistent with the employer's expectation that white collar
workers are more likely to work longer.
In attempting to estimate the likelihood that older
workers would be allowed to ease gradually into retirement
through such personnel policies as flextime,
or job redesigµ,

part-time options

respondents were asked to indicate if they
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allowed any of these options.

TABLE V-24
Personnel Policies for Older Workers
Question:

In order to structure worktime so that older
workers may ease gradually into retirement,
various plans have been suggested such as
flextime, part-time options, job redesign,
increased vacation time, etc.
Has your firm
considered or adapted plans to help older
workers gradually ease into retirement?
Number

Percent

Yes

18

22

No

59

71

6

7

Don ' t Know
Total

83

Nearly one quarter of those surveyed indicated that
they had adopted personnel policies designed to assist older
workers in preparing for retirement.

The employers using

flexible personnel policies were nearly un a nimous in their
use of part-time options for workers.

Generally, employers

indicated that workers could combine reduced hours with a
reduced work week • . One respondent indicated that older
workers also could change assignments to a less strenuous
one,

and another respondent claimed the union representing

workers at his firm would not allow part-time options for
older workers.
The question of whether employers will allow their
workers about to retire the option of remaining,

if only on
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a part-time basis,
mentioned,

is considered very important.

As previously

Social Security is designed to provide incentives,

amounting to 1/4 of 1 percent for each month between the ages
of 65 and 72 for which an individual defers retirement,
providing in effect for an increase of 3 percent per year
for each year a worker delays retirement.

In addition, the

earnings test has been increased to $5,500 and will be
completely abolished for everyone over 70 years of age.

Thus,

these two changes are expected to increase the likelihood that
older workers will remain in the workforce,

thereby decreasing

the job opportunities for younger workers and simultaneously
depressing relative wages for younger workers.
quarter of the employers in the sample already

Nearly one
allow workers

the option of remaining in the workforce in some reduced
capacity,

increasing the possibility that opportunities for

younger workers will be reduced.
When employers were questioned about whether long term
historical trends toward early retirement would be changed,
they were evenly split in their expectation concerning this
trend.

The following table displays the responses of

employers to the question of early retirement.
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TABLE V-25
Expect Changes in National Trend Toward Early Retirement
Question:

In recent years many men and women have elected
to retire before age 65, particularly at age 62,
when reduced Social Security benefits first
become available.
Do you expect any changes in
this national trend toward early retirement?
Number

Percent

Yes

33

40

No

34

41

Don't Know

16

19

Total

83

Significant numbers of employers do think that historical
changes will in fact be altered, and that workers will remain
in the workforce past age 65.

At least one employer indicated

that higher living costs would force more older workers to
remain in the labor force.

When questioned further,

employers

also believe that both men and women will woLk for longer
periods of time.

TABLE V-26
Expect Different Work Patterns for Men and Women
Question:

If yes, do you think there will be any differences
in the work patterns of men as opposed to the work
patterns of women?
Number
Yes, more men will work
longer
Yes, more women will
work longer
Both sexes will work
longer

Percent

8

24

1

3

25

73
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Thus, employers that expect historical trends toward
early retirement to be changed perceive these changes
to work across the board for all employees.
However, employers, while expecting more workers to
work lon ger , are not in favor of having all workers to be
required to work longer.

When presented with a question on

raising the age of eligibility for full Social Security
benefits to age 68,

fully 57 percent of all employers opposed

raising the age of eligibility.

While one-third of the sample

did agree that the age of eligibility should be raised, a
significant proportion did not agree that the age should be
increased.

TABLE V-27
Increasing the Eligible Age for Social Security Benefits
Question :

Last year (19 80 ) the U.S. Secretary of Commerce
proposed increasing the age at which Social
Security benefits are available to age 68.
Would you be:
Number
Strongly in favor
Moderately in favor
Somewhat in favor
Moderately opposed
Strongly opposed
Don't Know
Total

12
8
10
13

Percent

34

15
10
12
16
41

6

7

83

The relatively strong opposition to increasing the
age of eligibility for Social Security benefits is somewhat
surprising, as much has been written on the need to redesign
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the Social Security system.

Perhaps the opposition to

increasing the age of eligibility is best understood within
the context of the employee appraisal systems that most
employers utilize.

The following table shows that over

three quarters of all employers do not have a formal employee
appraisal mechanism .

TABLE V-28
Employee Appraisal System
Question:

How would you characterize your employee performance system?
Number
Formal

12

15

Informal

63

76

8

10

Don't Know
Total

Thus,

Percent

83

it can be concluded that the majority of employers

do not have a formal mechanism to evaluate the performance
of

th~ir

employees, a •. significant finding that helps to

explain why many employers would be opposed to increasing
the age of eligibility for Social Security benefits.

It is

also somewhat surprising to find that only 15 percent of
the sample had a formal employee appraisal system, since
recent legal activity at both the federal and state levels
has emphasized the need for objective employee appraisal
systems to support unbiased personnel practices.

If large
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numbers of older workers were suddenly to decide to remain
in the workforce, it is conceivable that most employers
would be unable, except in an informal context, to decide
who should be allowed to work.

Thus, it is likely that given

changes in the age of Social Security eligibility and other
areas of retirement policy, older workers will be more inclined
to seek legal remedies in the event they are discharged from
their jobs.

To some extent this has already eccurred, as

the Commission for Human Rights has had numerous age discrimination complaints against manufacturing firms.
The majority of employers do not expect to apply their
employee performance appraisal practices more rigorously
because of the 1978 ADEA Amendments.

In large measure, this

should be expected as few firms even have a formal process.

TABLE V-29
Effect on Employee Appraisal Systems
Question:

Do you expect your firm to apply its performance
appraisal practices more rigorously in the future
because of the changes in retirement age policy?
Number
Yes
No
Don't Know
Total

In fact,

Percent

6

7

68

82

9

11

83

the six respondents claimed that their perform-

ance appraisal practices were to be more rigorously applied
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to protect the c ompany from " incompetant " workers,
increase productivity and to assure proper records .

to
There

was no discernible pattern among employers with respect to
applying their employee appraisal systems in light of the
19 7 8 ADEA Amendments.
The apparent lack of a formal employee performance
appraisal system on the part of many firms is also demonstrated in the lack of a formal process to provide retraining
for employees.

Many employers , 13 o r

16 percent of those

sampled , indicate that they provide retraining by sending
employees to conferences,

seminars and conventions with a

simil a r n umbe r o f employers,

14 or 17 p ercent, ind icating

t hat t hey p a y for edu c ational courses taken by employees .
Still other employers provide for their retraining needs
by hiring consultants to provide "in-house " train i ng or by
on-the-job training.

However , 52 employers or 63 percent,

do not provide retraining by any f o rmal process .
The following table illustrates the distribution of
respon s es to the question of how employers provide for
the retraining needs of their employees .
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TABLE V-30
How Q.£_ You Provide Retraining
Question:

How do you provide for the retraining needs of
your employees?
Percent

Number
Send to conferences, seminars
or conventions
Pay for educational courses
Hire consultants to provide
workshops
Other
Conferences, educational
courses and consultants
Conferences, educational
courses, consultants and
other
Conferences and educational
courses
No formal process
Don't Know
Total

4
5

4. 8
6.0

4
3

4. 8
3.6

2

2.4

1

1. 2

6
52
6

7. 2
62.7
7. 2

83

Generally, it can be concluded that most firms do not
have a formal procedure either to evaluate an employees's
job performance or to provide for any additional job training
or job retraining.
In addition to the retraining of all workers, employers
were asked if there were any specific occupations or trades
in which they sought to retrain older workers.

As might be

expected, very few employers specifically geared any
training programs specifically for older workers.
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TABLE V-31
Retrain Older Workers
Question:

In your firm are there any specific occupations
or trades in which you strive to retrain workers
age 65 and older?
Number
Yes

Percent

8

9.6

No

61

73.5

Not Sure

14

16.9

Total

83

It can be concluded that retraining older workers
will not pose a substantial impediment to job opportunities
for younger workers , as less than one employer in ten seeks
to retrain workers age 65 and older.
An identical number of employers also believe that
retraining older workers will block lines of advancement
for workers.

The internal competition was specifically

identified by a number of respondents to involve management,
technical workers and unskilled workers.

However, the

majority of employers do not provide retraining specifically
for older workers and would therefore not expect any significant decrease in opportunities for other workers .
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TABLE V-32
Will Retraining Block Advancement
Question:

Do you anticipate that retraining older workers
to age 70 will block lines of advancement within
any specific occupation or among certain ty pes
of workers?
Number
Yes

Percent

8

9.6

No

41

49.4

Don ' t Know

34

41.0

Total

83

Although large firms of 100 or more employees perceived
that retraining older workers would block lines of advancement for other workers with a greater freque rl cy than did
other,

smaller firms, no significant relationship was found

to exist.
However, when employers who expected that retraining
older workers would block advancement were compared by SIC
code disaggregated into durable and non-durable industries,
a significant relationship was found.

It appears that

firms producing durable goods were likely to view retrainin g
older workers as a threat to the job opportunities of workers.
To some extent this relationship might have been expected,
as the durable goods industries have been particularly hard
hit durin g the last fe w years and are likely to vie w any
p olic y chan g es t h at su gg est t h at retir eme nt for wor k ers will
b e p ost p one d

to advers e ly affect job o pp ortunities for
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workers.

The relationship is shown in the following table.

TABLE V-33
CROSSTA BUL A'l'IO N
Will Re trainin g Bloak Advancement

S IC Code

h

Total

Yes

Ho

Du rable goods

7

36

43

Non-durable goods

1

39

l~

Total

8

75

83

0

Note:
x 2 = 4.516":
*Significant at . OS
Thus,

the industry in which a firm is classified seems

to be a better predictor of whether retraining will block
advancement than does a firm's size.
When employers were asked to identify the effect t he
ADEA will have on hiring older workers ,

fully 83 percent of

the employers believed they would not chan g e their p re sent
policies.

Only 6 percent felt they would hire more older

workers and less than 4 percent believed they would hire
fewer older workers.

As the next table illustrates,

firms

expect to continue past hiring practices and do not display
any significant movement toward hiring more older workers .
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TABLE V-34
Policies Toward Hiring Older Workers
Question:

What effect do you expect the changes in
retirement age to have on your organization's
policies toward hiring ol der worke rs.
Will
your firm:
Percent

Number
Hire more older workers
Not change hiring policies
Hire fewer older workers
Don ' t Know
Total

5

69

6. 0
8 3. 1

3
6

3.6
7.2

83

The pre c eedin g discussion indicates that many employers
have not experienced any significant impacts
ADEA Amendments.

f~om

the 1978

In an effort to guage the future implications

of the 1978 amendments , employers were asked to evaluate the
retirement decision of their workers under the assumption
that the high inflation rates of the past few years would
continue .

This question is considered a critical question

in the survey, as it is assumed that it will predict the
future behavior of workers.
To a large extent ,

the responses provided in the

following table p o rtend a reversal of historical patterns
toward early retirement.

As discussed in previous chapters,

labor force participation rates have been declining for all
workers, with age 65 as the age when many employees retire .
However,

early retirement before age 65 had been becoming more

of the norm for most workers, and, in fact,

the trend was
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toward retirement at an age earlier than 65 .

TABLE V-35
Inflation and the Retirement Decision
Question:

Continued high inflation rates may result in
employees choosi n g to remain in the labor force
past early and/or normal retirement ages .
If
inflation continues at the present rate, what
affect would you expect it to have on the retirement decisions of the o ld er worker in your organization?
Would they:
Number

Forego early retirement
Retire at the normal retirement
age
Wish to continue work i ng past
the normal retirement age
Not change their retirement
plans
Both forego early retireme n t
and work past the normal
retirement age
Don ' t Know
Total

Percent

13

15. 7

11

13.3

32

38.6

11

13.3

5
11

6.0
13.3

83

The significance of the above information is that 73
percent of all respondents believe that und e r

continued high

ra t es of inflation, workers will not elect earl y retirement.
In addition, Table V-25 clearly showed that 34 employers,
or 41 percent,

did not expect that the national trend toward

early retirement would be changed.

Inflation can then be

said to be an important variable in the retirement decision.
Since retirement for most workers is characterized by
a period of dissavings, that is workers must adjust t heir
lifestyle to a reduced income level,

it is also a time when
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the financial resources of a worker begin to be diminished.
Again, previous chapters have outlined the powerful influence
inflation has on a worker's retirement income, particularly
if the retiree has a pension that is not indexed to changes
in the cost of living.

It would be reasonable to assume

that under high rates of inflation which exist for long
periods of time,

exactly the situation we have experienced

over the last decade, workers would re-evaluate their decision
to retire and,

if possible, postpone that decision for as

long as possible.
Not only do the majority of employers believe workers
will not retire at an early age, but a majority of employers
also believe that workers will retire either at the normal
age or work beyond the normal retirement age.
Attempts to isolate variables that would influence
this decision proved unsuccessful.

Crosstabulations did

not produce any significant relationships.

Thus, it is

concluded that these trends away from both earl, and normal
retirement exist across the board for all firms included
in the survey.
When employers were queried on the impact that the
ADEA will have on different groups of employees,

there were

significant differences in the expected impact.

Employers

were asked to rate the affect on job opportunities for younger
workers, women, minorities and older workers , using a scale
from "great effect" to "no effect."

The following table

summarizes the responses to job opportunities for all four
groups.
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TABLE V-36
Impact on Job Opportunities for Different Groups
Question :

Since retirement age policy now prohi~its mandatory
retirement before age 70, job opportunities for
various groups of your employees may be affected.
Opportunities for some may be reduced, while
opportunities for others may be increased .
Using
a scale from great effect to no effect, please
indicate the extent to which you expect job
opportunities to be effected in your firm.
Please
use t he following codes:
1-Great Effect; 2-Moderate
Effect; 3-Some Effect; 4-Little effect; 5-No Effect;
6-Don't Know .

Group

Effect
Don ' t
Little None
Know
% #
% # % # %
11 21
25 29 35 10 11

Younger workers

Great
#
%
5
6

Minorities

2

2

5

6

10

12 17

21 38 46 11 13

Women

2

2

3

4

5

6 23

28 39 47 11 13

Older workers

6

7 12

15

4

5 15

18 35 42 11 13

Moderate
#
%
9
11

Some

#
9

As the table illustrates, younger workers are perceived
to be most affected by the changes in retirement age policy.
Over one-fourth of all employers believed that younger
workers would, to some extent, have reduced job opportunities
as a result of the ADEA.
workers,

A similar estimate exists for older

as 22 employers or 28 percent, believed that job

opportunities for older workers would be reduced to some
extent.

At this point, it should be stated that the construction

of the question may have confused some of the respondents
into thinking that the question allowed an answer as to which
g roup experienced an increase in job opportunitiesm which it
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did not.

Thus ,

the responses only for older workers are

not considered reliable.

Only one in five employers esti-

mated any impact for minority workers and one in eight
employers believed that women would be affe cted.
Extensive crosstabulations were conducted to determine
if there were any variable sets that would serve as a
predictor of differential impacts.

These crosstabulations

were conducted using the estimated job opportunity impact
as the dependent variable.

Independent variables were SIC

code, average employment, years in business, retirement
decision under high inflati o n and employee appraisal systems.
Cro ss tabulations were run for all four employee groups with
no significant relationships emerging.
The most significant finding of these analyses concerned
the lack of any independent variable that served to indicate
a relationship between employers and their estimate of how
job opportunities will be affected.

To the extent that the

survey results are representative of the manufacturing community,

it can be posited that the impacts will be felt across

the board by all manufact un ing firms,

regardless of SIC code,

years in business or other characteristics.
Thus,

it can be concluded that the ADEA will impact

younger workers most significantly .

Additionally, minorities

and women are not expected to be adversely affected by the
ADEA, with women the least expected group to be affected .
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CHAPTER VI
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In attempting to develop the policy implications of
this analysis,
made .

a number of important observations can be

First, mandatory retirement policies were not as

widespread as might be expected .

Only 16 percent of the

sample reported a mandatory retirement policy in 1977,
with a significant rel a tionship found to exist between the
size of the firm and its probability to have a mandatory
retir e ment policy .

As noted previously, Rhode Island has

a greater proportion than the national average of manufacturing firms employing fewer than 100 workers, which undoubtedly contributes to the low proportion of workers covere d ·.
by a mandatory retirement policy.

The importance of the

lack of a mandatory retirement poli e y has resulted in the
fact that many employers have had previou s experience with
workers remaining on the job past age 65 .

While large

numbers of workers not subject to a retirement policy
retired at age 65 anyway,

50 employers, or 60 percent of

the sample, claimed to have had some employees work past age
65 .
Generally,

employers expected that white collar workers

would most likely remain in the workforce, with executives,
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clerical,

technical and management staff considered the

most probable groups to continue working.

However,

employers

without a mandatory retirement policy fully expect some
blue collar workers to want to work longer, a conclusion
that should not be overlooked as these employers have had
blue collar workers remain past age 65 and should be better
able to estimate which workers are likely to continue working.
In addition, the survey results also suggested that
blue collar workers have historically retired at an earlier
age than the age of retirement for white collar workers,
suggesting that early retirement is most likely a pref erred
option for blue collar workers.
When employers were questioned on their views of
"uncapping" mandatory retirement,

the majority of employers

agreed that mandatory retirement should be abolished and
predicted that it would have little or no affect.

Firms

which have had mandatory retirement policies in the past
appeared most apprehensive about uncapping the age of
retirement.
Employers were evenly divided on the question of
whether they expect the trend toward early retirement to
change,

and those that did expect a change believe that

both men and women will want to work longer.

Surprisingly,

most employers do not agree with proposed changes to increase
the age of eligibility for Social Security benefits, as
fully 57 percent of all employers registered moderate to
strong opposition to this question.
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Significantly, 50 employers or 60 percent of the
sample,

speculated that under continuing high rates of

inflation workers would either forego early retirement or
continue working past the normal retirement age.

This is

considered to portend the reversal of the historical pattern
toward early retirement,

and may play an important role in

determining the long-term implications of the ADEA.
the information gathered during the survey,

From

there has not

been a dramatic short-term shift in the retirement practices
of many workers.

However, the

~erceived

threat of continuing

high inflation clearly stands out as a major variable in
the future retirement decisions of workers currently in the
labor force.

Thus,

the long-term implications of the ADEA

may well be determined by how well the country is able to
control inflation.
Another important finding relates to the area of
personnel policies affecting workers.

Nearly 25 percent of

all employers provide older workers with flexible arrangements in order to allow these workers to remain on the job.
To the extent that future retirement policy changes alter
the incentives for older workers to remain in the labor
force,
test,

such as through raising or eliminating the earnings
increasing the age of eligibility for Social Security

benefits or increasing through additional incentives the
possibility that older workers continue working, we will
probably see more workers work for longer periods of time.
This conclusion, although made more from inferences in the
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survey than from any specific questions contained in the
survey, warrants closer attention to the issue of further
changes in retirement policy.
Perhaps the most important finding in the area of
personnel policies is that over three-fourths of all employers
do not have a formal employee performance appraisal system.
This is considered very important for a number of reasons.
First,

employees may initiate an age discrimination case

with a private attorney as well as seek remedies through
the EEOC , and to the extent that the private bar is willing
to take these cases, we are likely to see more litigation
over age discrimination.

Second,

in determining the merits

of an age discrimination case, courts will closely examine
the performance appraisal systems utilized by employers,
and strike down those that are not comprehensive and do not
apply to all workers .

Thus, assuming the scenario of contin-

ued inflation and informal employee appraisal systems, we
are likely to witness an increase in the number of age discrimination cases against manufacturing firms in Rhode Island.
Consistent with this finding is the fact that 63 percent
of all firms surveyed have no formal process to provide
retraining for their employees, although over 30 percent of
the firms provide retraining through such practices as
sending workers to conferences, seminars,

conventions, hiring

consultants to do "in- house " training and by paying for
educational courses.

Less than 10 percent of the firms

surveyed strive to retrain older workers and a similar
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number believe this retraining for older workers will block
lines of advancement for younger workers.

This finding was

particularly true for firms manufacturing durable goods.
In terms of the impacts on various groups of workers,
the survey results clearly show that younger workers are
most likely to be affected by the changes brought about by
the ADEA of 1978.

For younger workers, the impacts will

likely be a decrease in job opportunities, as well as a
decrease in relative wages resulting from an inability to
be promoted into better paying positions.

The decreases

will likely affect many younger workers regardless of the
skilled or unskilled nature of their job.
While the information on the perceived impacts for
younger workers is fairly straightforward,
older workers must be qualified.
of the question,

the impacts for

As a result of the wording

it appears that there may have been some

confusion on its interpretation.

The wording of the question

may have confused some respondents into assuming that the
question allowed a response to indicate that job opportunities
were being increased for sooe workers, when the intent was to
identify which groups lost job opportunities.

Thus,

the

information provided in the responses under older workers
must be considered invalid.

This caveat is applicable only

to the older workers category.
It appears that the policy impact from the ADEA will be
greatest for younger workers.

They will face increasing

difficulty in obtaining manufacturing employment and in
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advancing internally once in the position .

To the extent

that white collar workers remain on the job longer than
blue collar worker s , competition for white collar jobs
will be most pronounced .

Additional changes in retirement

age policies , particularly those that provide incentives
for older workers to remain in the workforce, are likely to
be successful and will encourage more people, both men and
women,

to work for longer periods of time.

Continued high

inflation is anticipated to be a powerful stimulus for
workers to remain on the job and when combined with the
policy changes currently being discussed on the Federal
level, may decrease dramatically from the overall job
opportunities and advancement possibilities for younger
workers.
In addition ,

the following suggestions are offerred

for consideration .

First , manufacturing firms should review

their personnel policies to assure that these policies will
be in concert with the legislative changes, as well as with
the potential changes suggested by the survey results.

One

obvious area of concern is the pro c ess used to evaluate the
performance of wo r kers .

Recent court cases involving age

discr i mination have indicated that employers must utilize a
reasonable performance appraisal system that is job related,
written, objective and free of age bias .

In as much as the

majority of employers characterized their personnel appraisal
systems as informal ,

it is likely that these systems would

not withstand legal scrutiny .
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Also companies should seek, as much as possible,

to

have a broad and equitable age distibution across company
skill lines.

This conclusion is predicated on the fact

that a number of firms in the survey indicated they specifically sought to retrain older workers in certain specialized
crafts,

suggesting that if a company has too many older

workers in certain areas it will encoun ter future skills
replacement problems.
In yet another vein,

the survey results suggest that

competition for white collar positions will be most pronounced.
Even without the changes brought about by the ADEA, competition
for these middle-management and professional positions was
expected to be intense.
this situation.

The ADEA will further exacerbate

Thus, it is likely that many professional

and managerial workers will experience mid-career crises at
earlier ages.
turnover,

The result is likely to be greater instability,

and, most damaging to the economic vitality of the

state, outmigration from Rhode Island to other parts of the
country.

This implication is particularly problematic,

although career counseling and job retraining are possible
approaches to mitigating this problem within individual firms.
Since nearly 63 percent of all firms do not have a formal
process for providing retraining for their employees,
businesses should reach out to educational institutions to
provide this retraining.

Educational institutions have an

imperfect grasp of the retraining needs of many firms and
businesses should be more willing to articulate their
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retraining needs.
difficult,

However, the most obvious, albeit most

solution is to create an environment which makes

the state an attractive place for companies to expand or
relocate their businesses .
Finally, given the large numbers of older workers in
the state, it is clear that the retirement decisions of
workers are an important component of the economic health
of the state .

State agencies should examine future devel -

opments through appropriate social indicators in order to
keep abreast of potential changes in retirement patterns ,
as well as by closely monitoring all legislative t hrusts
that may affect the retirement decision of workers.
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APPENDIX A

SURVEY INSTRUMENTS

Next week a questionaire:from the
Rhode Island Statewide Planning Program
will be mailed to your firm.
Our survey
is the first statewide study of the opinions
of the Rhode Island ousiness community on
the impacts of raising the retirement age
from age 65 to age 70.
Your company was
randomly selected from a list of Rhode Island
businesses and your cooperation in providing
us with this information is crucial if we
are to accurately understand the effects of
the changes in retirement age policy.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation

l

RHODE ISLAND STATEWIDE PLANNING PROGRAM
265 f1elrose Street
Providence, Rhode Island 02907
AGE AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES SURVEY
For classification purposes, please provide the following information:
Ql:

How would you characterize your firm's business activity usino a two-digit code from the
Standard Industrial Classification c o d e ? - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Q2:

Which category most accurately reflects your averaoe employment?
51-100 employees
more than inn emoloyees

1-25 employees
26-5Q _employees
Q3:

Approximately how many years has your firm been in business in P. hode Isl and?
26-50 years
less than 5 years
- - - - - - - - - - - 6-10 years
- - - - - - - - - - - more than 50 years
- - - - - - - - - - - 11-25 years

We would like to begin with some questions regardinp your
retirement:

firm's~

policies on mandatory

Q5:

In 1977, did your firm have a mandatory retirement aae for any of its employees?
Yes (1)
(AtlS~ffR Q5-fJ12)
No l 2)
(SK IP TO fJ 13)
At what age were white1collar workers mandatorily retired?
Age _ _ __

Q6:

Was this mandatory retirement age part of a:

Q4:

pension or profit sharinCJ plan
(l) _ _ _ _ __
company policy
(2) _ _ _ _ __
collectively bargained union contract(3) _ _ _ _ __
other (Specify) :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _( )
Don't Know/No Response

4

\5) _ _ _ _ __

Q7:

At what age were blue 2 collar workers mandatorily retired?

QB:

Was this manaatory retirement age part of a:

Age

----

(l) _ _ _ _ __
pension or profit sharing plan
company policy
(2)
collP-<:tiv<>ly 1-~raafoerl union contract11) _ _ _ _ __
other (Specify) :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ( )

Don't Know/No Response
Q9:

How have you modified, or how do you intend to modify the mandatorv aoe in order to comply
with the changes in retirement age policy? Have you or will you:
increase to age 70
increase to past age 70
abolish it entirely
leave the age unchan9ed
Don't Know/No Response

QlO :

4

(5) _ _ _ _ __

(!) _ _ _ __
(2) _ _ _ __
(3) _ _ _ __
(4) _ _ _ __
(5) _ _ _ __

In the next few years do you expect any of your employees to choose to work past the aae
of 65?
Yes ( 1)
No (2) - Not Sure (3) ~

Qll :

Do you expect any particular group of your employees to work longer than other oroups?
Yes ( 1)
(ANSWER Q12)
flo
----(SKIP TO Ql7)
Not Sure (3)
(SKIP TO Q17)

lwhite collar workers:
2Blue collar workers:

prof€ssional and technical, managers and administrators, sales workers
and clerical workers
craft workers, operatives, laborers and service workers

Q21:

In 0 rder to structure worktime so that older workers may ease gradually
into retirement, various plans have been suggested such as flextime,
part-time options, job redesign, increased vacation time, etc. Has your
firm considered or adopted plans to help older workers gradually ease
into retirement?
Yes
(DESCRIBE BELOW)
NO
(SKIP TO Q22)
Don't Know/No Response
If yes, describe:

Q22:

Q23:

In recent years many men and women have elected to retire before age 65,
particularly at age 62, when reduced Social Securitv benefits first become available. Do you expect any change in this national trend toward
early retirement?
(l) _ __
Yes
(ANSWER Q23)
(2) _ __
No
(SKIP Q23)
Don't Know/No Response
(3)
If yes, do you think that there will be anv differe nces in the wo-r""'"k_ __
patterns of men as opposed to the work patterns of women?

Yes, more men will work longer
Yes, more women will work longer
Both sexes will elect to work longer
Q24:

(l) _ __
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

_ __
_ __
_ __
_ __
_ __

In your f irm are there ~cific occupations or trades in whDch you strive
to r:train work ers age 6S and older ?
Yes
No
'1nn • +-

Q26:

(l) _ __
(2) _ __
(3) _ __

Last year (1980) the u. S. Secretary of Commerce proposed increasing the
age at which full Social Security Lenefits are available to age 68.
Would you be :
st~on gly in favor
moderately in favor
somewhat in favo r
moderately opposed
strongly opposeC
Don 't Know/No Response

Q25:

(l) _ __
(2) _ __
(3) _ __

(l) _ __
T'nn w/ ",i n

Re~nnp~e

(2) _ __
(3) _ __

llow do you r r ovide for the retraining needs of your employees?
send to conferences , seminar s, conventions
(l} ____
pay for educational course s
(2)
hire consultants t o nrovicte "in-house" workshops
(3) _ _ __
other (Specify) :--------------------~
4) _ _ __
(5)
don 't provide retraining by any formal process

Q27:

Do you anticipate that retraining older workers to age 70 will block
lines of advancement within any specific occupation or among certain
types of workers?
Yes
(Specify): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (l)
No
(2) _ __
Don 't Know/No Response
(3) _ __

Q28:

How woul <l you characterize your employee performance appraisal system?
Pormal
Informal
Don't Know/No Response

Q29:

(l) _ __
(2) _ __
(3) _ __

Do you expect your firm to apply its performance appraisal practices
more rigorously in the future because of the changes in retirement age
policy?
Yes
(Why?) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (l) _ __
No
(2) _ __
Don't Know/No Response
(3) _ __

Q30:

What effect do you expect the changes in retirement age to have on your
organization's policies toward hiring older workers? Will your firm:
Hire more older workers
Not change hiring policies
Hire fewer older workers
Don't Know/No Response

(l) _ __
(2) _ __
(3) _ __
(4) _ __

ST ATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANT ATIO NS

Department of Administration
STATEWIDE PLANNING PROGRAM
265 Melrose Street
Providence, Rhode Island 02907

February 27, 1981

Dear Rh ode Island Businessman:
Th e enclo sed survey is the first statewide study of the
opinions of the Rhode Island business co ~mun ity on the impacts
of raising the retirement age from 65 to 70. Your company was
randomly selected from a list of Rhode Island businesses and
your coope ration in providing us with information is crucial
if we are to accurate ly understand and pla n for the effects of
th is change in ret irement age policy .
Please b e assured that all responses will be held in the
s trictest confidence and results wi ll be displayed only in the
agg reg ate.
Should you need the results o f the survey for
planni ng purposes within your organ ization, or wish to discuss
the ~uestio n s contairied in the survey, fe e l free to contact
either Patric k Fingliss or John O'Brien of our staff at
277-2656.
Thank you in advance for your cooper ation.

DWV/bam
Enclosure

ST ATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANT A'TIONS

Department of Administration
STATEWIDE PLANNING PROGRAM
265 Melrose Street
Providence, Rhode Island 02907

: iarch 18,

1981
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APPENDIX B

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

In order to determine the specific impacts of the
1978 ADEA Amendments for Rhode Island, a mail survey was
conducted of 107 manufacturing firms located in the state.
The survey sampling plan chosen was a random stratified
sampling methodology using the quota method.

Manufacturing

businesses engaged in the production of goods from Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC)
SIC 21 and 29, were surveyed.

codes 20 to 39, excluding
These two SIC categories

were omitted as there are relatively few Rhode Island firms
engaged in the manufacture of tobacco products (SIC 21) or
petroleum and coal products (SIC 29).
Manufacturing firms in Rhode Island were selected for
the survey sampling plan for a variety of reasons.

First,

the State Commission for Human Rights found that almost half
of all age discrimination charges were filed on behalf of
individuals employed in manufacturing industries.

Second,

firms involved in manufacturing employ over 133,000 people
in Rhode Island, or approximately one-third of the state's
total labor force and,

as such, play a vital role in the

overall economic health of the state.

Third, the 1979

Portland State University study, the most comprehensive
analysis of the subject of the 1978 ADEA Amendments,
unintentionally undersampled manufacturing industries,

attaining a 20 percent response rate from manufacturing
firms while the national distribution of manufacturing
industries is over 30 percent.

Fourth, and perhaps most

important, was the existence of the 1979-80 edition of
the Directory

£i

Manufacturers published by the Rhode

Island Department of Economic Development, which provided
the name, location and number of employees for over 2,600
manufacturing firms currently located in Rhode Island.
This directory provided the framework for the random selection
of manufacturing firms by two-digit SIC code and allowed
firms with fewer than four employees, and not covered under
the R.I . State FEPA age discrimination law or the 1978 ADEA
Amendments,

to be excluded from the sample.

The Directory

was considered a significant universe record and not a
statistical sample, thus enabling it to be used for the
purpose of selecting a sample of firms to be surveyed.
The following table compares the information contained in
the Directory with data available from ''County Business
Patterns -

1977" and fourth quarter totals for 1978 for

firms covered under the R.I. Department of Employment
Security (DES).

TABLE B-1
Comparability of the Directory

--with

Selected Data Sources

SIC Code
20
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Number of Firms by SIC Code
1
Directory
County Business Patterns 2
110
189
49
31
40
68
186
87
106
26
50
104
364
281
70
50
64
897

132
192
60
49
31
56
191
67
95
24
43
103
390
292
6lf
44
45
929

DES3
147
219
76
51
51
62
204
85
113
28
58
10
408
280
70
48
66
1300

1 Totals determined by manual tabulations (1979- 80
Directory£.!. fanufacturers, R.I. Department of Economic
Development, 1980).
2 Totals provided in "County Business Patterns-1977"
(U.S. Department of Commerce, pps. 3-6, 1979).
3Totals provided in "State Summary-Employment and Total
Payrolls" R.I. Department of Employment Security, 1978.

As Table B-1 illustrates, the Directory is a closer
estimate than is the R.I. Department of Employment Security
information when compared to the information provided in
"C ounty Business Patterns" in all but six (6) instances.

While it is recognized that all three data sources were
prepared in different ways and for different years,

the

Directory does not reflect any totals that are unrepresentative and do not jeopardize the use of the Directory as a
basis for conducting the survey.
As an additional check on the reliability of the
Directory as an appropriate sampling resource,

the employment

totals provided in the Directo_EY were compared to the employment totals provided in "County Business Patterns" and the
fourth quarter Department of Employnent Security information
for 1978.

This comparison, presented in the following table,

again suggest the Directory is a reliable survey tool as
manufacturing employment rose from the 1977 figure provided
by the "County Business Pattern" summary of 125,725 manufacturing workers to a 1978 total of 135,745, as reported by the
Department of Employment Security, a cc ounting in part for
the discrepancy among some of the totals.

In addition,

larger totals in the Directory column are a result of the
fact that firms producing products that fall into two or
more SIC groups are listed each time, with the result that
the employment totals are inflated.

Similarly, employment

totals provided in the Directory appear,

in many instances,

to be rounded numbers, also inflating the total employment
figure for each SIC category.

TABLE B-2
Comparability E.f the Directory
with
Selected Data Sources
Total Employment by SIC Code
SIC Code

Directoryl

20
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

3,846
14,392
4,431
468
1, 13 9
3, 713
5,058
6,072
10,121
3,042
3,529
10,155
12' 14 1
11,715
10,854
6,668
8,468
37,839

DES 3

County Business Patterns2
3,715
13,681
2,753
250-499
838
2,717
4,769
2,934
5,274
2,783
1,711
9 , lD 1
15,432
9,305
9,521
1,835
4,999
32,189

3,861
12,501
3,764
606
1 , 19 1
3,127
5,184
2,992
7, 195
3,623
3,370
6,479
10,699
9,699
11,783
6,130
5,342
38,186

1 Totals determined by manual tabulations (1979-80
Directory £.f Manufacters, R.I. Department of Economic Development, 1980).
2Totals provided in "County Business Patterns-1977,
U.S. Department of Commerce, pps . 3-6, 1979.
3Totals provided in "State Summary-Employment and Total
Payrolls" R.I. Department of Emp loyment Security, 1978.

Thus,

the Directory

£.f

Manufacters was determined to

provide an acceptable list of the manufacturing industries
located in Rhode Island because the information contained in
the Directory was consistent with other information from
"County Business Patterns" and the R.I. Department of Employment

Security .

In addition , the Directory was also considered

an acceptable universe record because it included firms
from all parts of the state and as such can be considered
geographically representative of the distribution of manufacturing firms in the state .

Finally,

the Directory

was used because it did not , by design, systematically
exclude any firms from being listed .
Once th e .decision was made to use the Directory as the
basis for the selection of firms , a sampling plan wa s prepared .
A lottery-type selection of firms was considered, but rejected
on the basis that it would not guarantee that all SIC groups
would be included in the survey .

In order to achieve coverage

in every SIC category from 20 to 39, excluding SIC 21 and 29,
a stratified sample was considered to be most appropriate.
In addition, this stratified sample was constructed to utilize
the qu o ta method ,

rather than the proportional method .

Although the proportional method was considered, it
was not u sed because of Rhode Island ' s relatively undiverse
economic base .

A proportional sample would have involved

sampling indu s tries by SIC in proportion to the distribution
of these firms withi h the total R.I . manufa c turing base .
Fo r e x ampl e , if a p r o p ortio n al stratified survey had been
used, SIC 20 (Food and Kindred Porducts) employing about 3
percent of the manufacturing labor force would have resulted
in 3 percent of the survey total being selected from this
SIC group.

This method raised the possibility that if the

small number of firms to be surveyed in SIC 20 chose not to

respond,

there would not be any coverage in that SIC group .

While the possibility that firms will elect not to respond
to a survey is clearly inherent in every survey design,
are survey sampling plans which can,

there

to a large extent,

increase the possibility of coveraee in every subset.
In order to achieve the goal of coverage in every SIC
category,

the sampling plan was designed to include a

stratification system using the quota method.

The sampling

plan was stratified by SIC code, dividing each SIC stratum
into three subsets:

first,

and 19 workers; second,
workers;

and third,

those firms employing between 4

firms employing between 20 and 99

firms employing more than 100 wor kers .

The quota method involved randomly selecting two firms from
each of these subsets,

thereby allowing for a maximum of

six (6) firms from each SIC code.

Thus; the sampling plan

allowed for a maximum of 108 surveys, a result of six (6)
surveys for each of the eighteen (18)

SIC codes.

Once the

random sampling began it became apparent that SIC 24

(Lumber

and Wood Products) would not legitimately provide the
required number of responses.
sampled to include only five
of six (6) firms,

As a result,
(5) firms,

this SIC was

instead of the goal

reducing the total number of surveys to

107.
The following table shows the distribution contained
in the Directory of firms by size and highlights the sampling
constraint in SIC 24.

TABLE B-3
SIC Code £y Employment Size
SIC Co de
20
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

1-19

20-99

100 or more

30
82
12
6
8
35
41
20
42
12
16
29
115
70
28
13
20
308

8
48
12
1
2
13
14
12
22
5
7
22
25
18
2lf
8
13
86

66
49
25
22
28
17
118
49
39
8
23
48
200
186
16
25
27
424

Source:

No
Response
6
10
0
2

2
3
13
6
3
1
4
5
24
7
11
4
4
79

Manual tabulations of the Directory of ~fanufacturers,
R . I . Department of Economic Development, 1979-80 .

The information in the preceeding table is particularly
useful in identifying a number of specific concerns regarding
the survey methodology .

In all but five SIC categories,

small firms employing less than twe nty workers constitu t e
over half of the total number of manufacturing firms doing
business in the state .

This large number of s mall fir ms is

somewhat higher than the national distribution of small fir ms,
although nationally sma ll firms comprise over one quarter of
all businesses .

However, the sampling plan was construct e d

to rando ml y sel e c t

t wo f ir ms fro m eac h of the abo ve s u bsets,

t he r eby r ed ucing the nu mber o f small firms,

as a p ro p ortion

of the total, and increasing the number of medium and large
firms,

again as a proportion of the total.

The sampling

plan can then be criticized on the basis that it undersampled small firms by utilizing the quota method rather
than the proportional method.

However, it should be pointed

out that the Portland State study found the greatest impacts
of the 1978 ADEA Amendments among large firms and the sampling
plan was constructed under the assumption that the size of
the firm was an important variable in assessing the impacts
of the legislation.
A second concern of the sampling plan regards the
arbitrary selection of the total number of firms included
in the sample.

As a result,

the sampling plan can be

criticized on the basis that it undersampled certain SIC
categories by utilizing the quota method.

For example,

SIC 20, which employs about 3 percent of the total manufacturing workforce was sampled to the same extent as was
SIC 39, Miscellaneous

fanufacturin g , which employs about

32 percent of the total manufacturing workforce.

This

undersamplin g was considered unaviodable considering time
and resource constraints.
The following table displays the geographic distribution
of the firms contacted during the survey .

As the table

illustrates, firms located in twenty-eight (28)
employing over 14,800 workers, were surveyed.

communities,
The totals

closely parallel the general distribution of manufacturing
firms in Rho de Island, with Providence accounting for the

the greatest number of firms surveyed, followed by
Pawtucket, Yarwick and East Provi<lence.

TABLE B-4
Geographical Distribution of Surveyed Firms
City

.£.E_

Town

Number of Firms

Barrington
Burrillville
Central Falls
Coventry
Cranston
Cumberland
East Greenwich
East Providence
Exeter
Hopkinton
Johnston
Lincoln
Middletown
Newport
North Kingstown
North Providence
North Smithfield
Pawtucket
Portsmouth
Providence
Scituate
Smithfield
South Kingstown
Warren
West Warwick
Westerly
Woonsocket

1
1
5
1
7
2
4
8
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
14
1
24
2
4
2
4
3
1
3
Total

107

Approximately 4 percent of the firms engaged in manufacturing enterprises were surveyed,

although nearly 10

pe rcent of the total workers employed in manufacturing were
surveyed .

This proportional difference is the result of

the sampling plan design to include firms employing more
than 100 workers as one-third of the entire sample.
result,

As

a

some of the largest private manufacturing employers

in Rhode Island,

including eight employers of over 400

people and two employers of over 1,000 workers, were
included in the sample.
Research into the use of mail s u rvey techniques indicated
that there were a number of approaches that increase, albeit
slightly, the overall response rate .

For example, the use

of an introductory postcard announcing that a survey woul d
be forthcoming,

the use of first-class mail, a cover letter,

a followup letter accompanied by another copy of the survey
and a survey printed on different colored paper have all
been found to increase the response rate in mail surveys.
Generally , the response rate in mail surveys is between 40
and 50 percent, with a response rate of 75 percent achieved
only rarely and under optimal conditions.
Two other significant variables to the success of the
mail survey approach included the "intrinsic value " factor and
the !'closed response" approach .

The "intrinsic value " factor

indicated that the greater the intrinsic interest of the
subject of the survey to the questions included in the survey,
the higher the response rate.

The "closed response" approach

indicated that higher response rates would result if those
surveyed could expFess their views by selecting among predetermined responses rather than by asking respondents to
provide lengthy and time consuming respon s es.

The closed

response also facilitates coding and comparability of
responses.
All these techniques were utilized in guiding the
development and implementation of the survey.

The survey

was designed utilizing the closed response approach, allowing
for limited explanatory responses.

Surveys were preceeded

by a postcard and the survey included a cover letter under
the signature of the Chief of the Rhode Island Statewide
Planning Program, under whose auspices the survey was
conducted.

The survey was printed on blue paper and was

mailed with a self-addressed,

stamped envelope bearing the

Statewide Planning Program address.

A followup letter,

including another copy of the survey and another self-addressed,
stamped envelope was sent to respondents who failed to return
the initial questionnaire.
In addition, all surveys were addressed to the personnel
director on the assumption that this person had, by virtue
of position,

the best vantage point to answer the questions

contained in the survey.

The personnel director, whether

the owner of the company, as in the case of a small business
or an individual, as in the case of a larger company, would
have the greatest interest in the personnel affairs of that
company and presumably would view the questions contained
in the survey within the "intrinsic value" context.
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